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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STATE REGULATION OF MAJOR
AND MINOR POLITICAL PARTIES
INTRODUCTION

America's courts recognized early the conflict of interest inherent in providing politicians the power to create the electoral laws by
which they are elected. As Judge George W. McCrary, a legal scholar,
Eighth Circuit Judge, and member of the House of Representatives
noted in 1897:
It is within the province of the Legislature to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations for the conduct of elections .... But it is
manifest that under color of regulating the mode of exercising the
elective franchise, it is quite possible to subvert or injuriously restrain the right itself, and a statute that clearly does either of these
things must, of course, be held invalid .... I
The temptation to use electoral regulations as political weaponry is
understandable; politicians can lose power through the conduct of
elections. It is therefore not surprising that political scientists have
found that the Democrats and Republicans "have built themselves virtually impenetrable barriers against challenge by new parties." 2
Many states have created a framework of laws that control the
activities of political parties.3 There are two paths to elected political
participation in American government on a mass scale: 4 (1) participation in the major parties, 5 or (2) the creation of new political parties.
1

GEORGE W. MCCRARY, AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS

§

126 (Henry L. McCune ed.,

Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 4th ed. 1897). Some modem courts explicitly recognize this
problem as well. See Patriot Party v. Mitchell, 826 F. Supp. 926, 928 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("The
state legislature, which enacts the ballot access laws, is comprised primarily of major party
politicians. The tension exists because these laws may become so restrictive and burdensome that they impinge upon a minor party's... rights.... ."), affd, 9 F.3d 1540 (3d Cir.
1993).
2 Richard S. Katz & Robin Kolodny, Party Organizationas an Empty Vessel: Parties in
American Politic, in How PARTIES ORGANIZE 23, 47 (Richard S. Katz & Peter Mair eds.,
1994).
3 See, e.g., N.Y. Eec. Law §§ 2-100 et seq. (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1997).
4 The election of independent candidates presents many of the same concerns as
minor-party candidacies. Although these concerns are certainly relevant to many of the
issues raised in this Note, an in-depth analysis of them is beyond the Note's scope. For an
analysis of independent candidates in Supreme Court jurisprudence see Brian L Porto,
The Constitutionand the Ballot Box: Supreme CourtJurisprudenceand Ballot Access for Independent
Candidates,7 B.Y.U.J. PuB. L. 281, 288-306 (1993).
5 As Political ScientistJames W. Ceaser explains:
The party system... affects political activity in several key areas. It has a

major impact on which political forces are given expression and which....
are held back; on how majorities are put together; on how governing takes
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In a democracy, political parties are political actors of vital importance: they provide the means through which ordinary citizens can
control their own governance. 6 Despite the vaunted position of political parties in political theory, politicians in state legislatures often interfere in the parties' operation and constrain their political activities.
Political scientist Kay Lawson has noted:
State laws undermine political parties in almost every way imaginable. They make it difficult and sometimes impossible for parties to
form and to get on the ballot, to control their own nomination
processes, to define issues effectively, and to hold their elected representatives accountable.... One cannot speak of party renewal...
without considering
the need for reform of the election laws at the
7
state level.
For example, the Florida legislature requires that the state parties' executive committees include all congressmen, allows elected officials to
appoint the members of the executive committee, and creates a system of weighted voting by elected officeholders in internal party elections.8 New York state law controls the composition of county
committees, 9 party quorum requirements,' 0 and the terms party members may serve."
This Note surveys the recent developments in constitutional law
that limit a state's ability to control political parties. The Supreme
Court has long recognized that political organizations have a First
Amendment right, the freedom of association, to work collectively
with others in pursuit of political goals.' 2 In addition, courts have relied on a number of constitutional doctrines to recognize a "right to
vote" that protects voters' ability to participate effectively in the political process.' 3 These doctrines restrict the states' power to control
political parties' internal political affairs and access to the states' political machinery.
Commentators consistently criticize the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the state regulation of political parties as muddled and
place; and on how people are contacted and mobilized to participate in
politics.
James W. Ceaser, PoliticalParties-Declinin, Stabilizing or Resurging, in THE NEW AMERICAN
POLITICAL SYSTEm 87, 102 (Anthony King ed., 1990).
6
See A. JAMES REICHLEY, THE LIFE OF THE PARTiEs: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLMCAL

PARTIES 414-15 (1992) (listing the beneficial functions parties serve in a democracy).
7

Kay Lawson, How State Laws UndermineParties, in ELEcnONs AMERICAN STYLE 240 (A.

James Reichley ed., 1987).
8

9
1o
11
12

13

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.091 et seq. (West Supp. 1996).

N.Y. ELEc. LAw §§ 2-104, 2-110 (McKinney 1978).
N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 2-104(3) (McKinney 1978).
N.Y. ELEc. LAw § 2-106 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.
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confusing.1 4 This Note discusses two emerging trends in electoral law
jurisprudence. First, over the past decade, the Supreme Court and
lower courts have decided a series of cases that have strengthened the
major political parties' associational rights, 15 but have slightly weakened protection for a voter's right to a "meaningful" or effective
vote. 16 As a result of these decisions, the major parties have gained
significant legal power to define and control the internal party
processes without state interference. 17 With this increase in "party autonomy," the courts have strengthened the power of state party organizations to control the content of the party's ideological message,' 8
and increased their ability to influence the nomination of candidates. 19 These developments have the potential to increase the major
parties' effectiveness as political actors. Second, in contrast to their
treatment of major parties, the courts have not improved the ability of
minor parties to compete in the political marketplace, but instead
have provided states greater leeway to obstruct their development.
Courts have generally upheld state intrusions into minor parties' internal affairs20 and are very unlikely to invalidate state ballot-access
laws that burden minor party activities. 2 1 Taken together, these two
trends produce a legal framework that actively discourages the formation of new minor parties and decreases the effectiveness of those that
exist, while simultaneously strengthening the political effectiveness of
14 See, e.g., LAuRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-20, at 1102 (2d
ed. 1988) (discussing "the doctrinal enigmas that bedevil the law of ballot access"); ToddJ.
Zywicki, FederalJudicialReview of State Ballot Access Regulations:Escapefrom the PoliticalThicke
20 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 87, 88-89 (1994) ("Where the Supreme Court has intervened [in
electoral law challenges], its decisions have been essentially random, both with regards to
the level of review to be applied, and with regard to how the various fact patterns have
been related."); Bennett J. Matelson, Note, Tilting the Electoral PlayingField: The Problem of
Subjectivity in PresidentialElectionLaw, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238, 1245-46 (1994) ("The Court's
ballot access cases have yielded few unshifting rules [because of] the Supreme Court's
failure to establish clearly the level of scrutiny to apply to the challenged state action.").
15 See infra Part I.D.
16
See infta Part I.E.1.
17 See, e.g., Brian L. Porto, The Constitution and PoliticalParties:Supreme CourtJurisprudence and its Implicationsfor Partybuilding,8 CONST. COMMENTARY 433 (1991) (documenting
the increased legal capacity of the parties to govern themselves free from state interference); William R. Kirschner, Note, Fusion and the AssociationalRights of MinorPoliticalParties,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 683, 691 (1995) ("While the Supreme Court has afforded the states
considerable latitude to promote orderly elections, it has concurrently strengthened the
rights of political parties as core First Amendment actors."). But see Mark E. Rush, Voters'
Rights and the Legal Status of American PoliticalParties,9J.L. & POL. 487 (1993) (challenging
the commentaries that suggest that the Court has deliberately expanded the associational
rights of political parties).
18 See infra Part I.D.1.
19 See infra Part I.D.2.
20 See infra Part I.E.
21 See discussion Part III. Ballot access laws are the formal requirements a party or
candidate must satisfy before a state will print a candidate's name on a ballot.
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the major parties. 2 2 Minor parties, who represent views that conflict
with established party dogma, are left unprotected in constitutional
jurisprudence and their message is filtered out and lost. As a result,
the gap in the legal status of minor and major parties-a bias that has
favored the major parties for the majority of the century-has grown.
Part I of the Note provides an overview of the jurisprudence defining the constitutional limitations on states' power to regulate political parties and reviews recent courts of appeals decisions that
demonstrate the application of the Supreme Court's associational
rights and "right to vote" jurisprudence. Part II provides a short survey of ballot access litigation, a special class of cases implicating both
minor-party associational rights and voters' "fundamental" right to
vote. This Part asserts that minor parties will not succeed in reducing
state barriers to political participation through future court
challenges.
Finally, Part III discusses the political and doctrinal consequences
of these legal developments. This Part argues that the expansion of
major-party associational rights reinforces the disparity between the
legal status of major and minor parties and undermines the Supreme
Court's ballot-access doctrine. Finally, this Part discusses the political
implications of these legal developments in light of current trends in
electoral and party politics. The Note concludes that the current legal
doctrine that defines the permissible state regulation of minor parties
should be reassessed.
I
STATES' POWER TO REGULATE THE "TIMES, PLACES AND
MANNER" OF ELECTIONS

A.

The Elections Clause: A Historical Perspective

The Elections Clause of the Constitution provides that states may
regulate "[t] he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives ...but the Congress may at any time by
Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing
Senators."23 The clause represents a carefully drawn compromise.
The states retained the discretion to promulgate regulations, but the
federal government reserved the power to supersede state laws in or22 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 7, at 243-47.
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. The Constitution includes other clauses that define the
limits of states' power to regulate elections. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 provides that
"[t] he House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year
by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XVII provides, "The electors in each State shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislatures."
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der to protect its own existence from state interference.2 4 Otherwise,
as Justice Story noted, "an exclusive power in the state legislatures to
regulate elections for the national government would leave the existence of the union entirely at their mercy." 25 Although the Founders
invested considerable discretion in the states, they did so mindful of
the potential for the states to use that power to subvert the national
interest. Therefore, a state's power to regulate elections is clearly limited. Specifically, a state's broad power to prescribe the time, place,
and manner of elections "does not extinguish the State's responsibility
to observe the limits established by the First Amendment rights of the
'26
State's citizens.
Any interpretation of the Elections Clause should also recognize
a simple historical fact: when this provision was drafted, political parties were generally unknown and positively feared.2 7 To the Founders, the entire structure of our government-the separation of
powers-was predicated on a fear that factions, operating through
parties, would impose their will on the country.23 John Taylor, a
Founding Father and libertarian from Virginia, lamented: "The situation of the public good, in the hands of the two parties nearly poised
as to numbers, must be extremely perilous. ' 29 John Adams feared the
specter of the "division of the republic into two great parties, each
arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in opposition to
one another."3 0 Regardless of whether the Founders' fears were politically naive, unreasonable, or unfounded, it is fair to conclude that the
Founders evinced no particular theory of party politics, let alone one
desiring continuous two-party domination of American politics. 3 1
The Supreme Court, in Smiley v. Holm,3 2 interpreted the Elections
Clause as allowing states to adopt the procedural safeguards necessary
SeeJOSEPH STORY, ON THE CONSTITrTION § 816 (1858).
Id. § 817.
26
Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986).
27
See James L. Sundquist, Strengthening the National Parties, in Elections American
Style, supra note 7, at 195, 197 (noting that parties were denounced for the "corruption" of
legislatures).
28 Id. AsJames Sundquist explained, "Madison advanced as one of the Constitution's
central merits that it would tend 'to break and control the violence of faction,' which he
equated with party." Id. at 198 (quoting THE FEDERAusT No. 10 (James Madison)). In fact,
Madison felt that a greater number of parties would tend to lessen the chance that any one
would gain oppressive power. Id. at 199.
29 REICHLEY, supra note 6, at 29.
30 Letter from John Adams to Jonathan Jackson (Oct. 2, 1780), quoted in REICHLEY,
supra note 6, at 17.
31
See Lawson, supra note 7, at 240-41 ("Parties were heartily despised in the late eighteenth century and were not even mentioned in the constitution."). The Founders' views
on parties demonstrates that there is no constitutional basis for any particular view of how
courts should view parties in American Democracy. See supratext accompanying notes 2831.
32
285 U.S. 855 (1932).
24

25
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to run a fair election and thereby protect the constitutional right to
exercise the franchise.3 3 Implicitly, this constitutional delegation of
power to the states did not include the power to substantively discourage or interfere with political competition among aspiring participants. Rather, it was the fear that the states would subvert the
electoral process that spurred the Founders to retain the power in the
federal government to supersede any state electoral law.3 4 The
Supreme Court recently emphasized this limitation in U.S. Term Limits
v. Thornton'3 5 "The Framers understood the Election Clause as a grant
of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of
power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional constraints."3 6 Because
of this limited mandate, the Elections Clause should not be understood as enabling states to imperil the rights of minor political parties.
Although broad discretion exists, it is discretion laden with the potential for mischief. The states must walk a tightrope; they must ensure
the fairness of elections without imperiling the ability of their own
political opponents to participate in that system.
B.

The Supreme Court and the Regulation of Politics

To demonstrate how the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
benefitted the major parties, but provided little benefit to the minor
parties, the nature of the rights implicated by state regulation of political parties must be clear. Minor parties, of course, operate within the
same framework of laws and constitutional limitations that define the
relationship between -the major parties and the state. 37 Disputes between states and political parties primarily involve two constitutional
doctrines: (1) the "freedom of association" and (2) the "right to
The Court explained:
It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to
provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times
and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting,
protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of
votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of
election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.
Id. at 866.
34 As Story explained: "Nor let it be thought, that such an occurrence is wholly imaginary. It is a known fact, that, under the confederation, Rhode Island, at a very critical
period, withdrew her delegates from congress; and thus prevented some important measures from being carried." STORY, supra note 24, § 816.
35 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
36 Id. at 1869.
37 See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 218-19
nn.5-10 (1989) (documenting state statutes that California applied to both major and minor parties).
33
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vote."38 These rights are often both at issue when political parties
challenge election laws.39 In addition, there is a third doctrinal category that is analytically distinct-the Court's ballot-access jurisprudence. When states create requirements that deny or impede minor
parties' ability to place their candidates' names on the ballots, the
states impinge on both associational rights and voting rights. In this
context, courts often consider the infringement of the parties' and
voters' rights inexorably intertwined because voters associate with candidates through the act of voting; a denial of a candidate's place on
the ballot thus interferes with both voting rights and associational
rights. 4 0
1. PoliticalParties and the Freedom of Association
The early cases that established the freedom of association were
based on the First Amendment rights of free speech and peaceful assembly.4 1 Once the Supreme Court recognized this right to work collectively with others in the pursuit of First Amendment goals, 42 the
activities of political parties became a focal point for the right. Professor Lowenstein succinctly describes the logic leading to the First
Amendment protection of political parties:
The doctrinal argument against [state] regulation of political
parties is simple and, within the conventional First Amendment
framework, nearly irresistible. [First] ...is the premise that a political party is a private organization. From this premise it follows that
a party and its members, like other private organizations and their
members, enjoy the First Amendment right of freedom of association. Furthermore, since on most accounts the First Amendment is
centrally concerned with protection of political speech and associa38 See Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicia Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third PartiesNeed
Not Apply, 28 HIARv. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 193-99 (1991). In some cases, the Equal Protection
Clause can be implicated as well. The status of traditional equal protection analysis, which
the Court relied on in Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), is uncertain. See infra
note 115.
39

See, e.g., Anderson, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).

According to Justice Douglas:
The right "to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas" is one activity of that nature that has First Amendment Protection.... [T]he right to vote [is] a "fundamental political right" that is
"preservative of all rights." The rights of expression and assembly may be
"illusory if the right to vote is undermined."
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 38-39 (1968) (Douglas,J, concurring) (citations omitted).
41 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (establishing the right
of a group to keep its membership rolls private); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)
(allowing NAACP branch to keep membership rolls private despite city ordinance requiring municipal organizations to divulge such information).
42
In Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984), the Court recognized
the "freedom of expressive association" which is centrally concerned with political
association.
40
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don, the constitutional right of freedom of association enjoyed by a
political party is especially strong in comparison with the rights of
nonpolitical groups.43
One key weakness in this syllogism is the premise that political
parties are private rather than public entities. 44 If political parties are
45
purely private entities, then they may hold constitutional rights.
Under the state action doctrine, however, a purely private entity is not
46
required to respect the constitutional rights accorded other citizens.
Political parties were purely private organizations from the 1790s until
the Civil War. 47 Thus, "it was no more illegal to commit fraud in the
party caucus or primary than it would be to do so in the election of
officers of a drinking club."48 However, due to the efforts of Robert
La Follette and the Progressives, states began to treat political parties
as "public agencies" during the early 1890s and 1900s; by the 1920s
"most states had adopted a succession of mandatory statutes regulating every major aspect of the parties' structures and operations." 49 Because the parties were "public" under conventional constitutional
doctrine, the courts "deprive[d] the parties of the protections of the
Bill of Rights." 50 By the 1970s, federal courts considered "virtually
every aspect of the party's presidential nomination process .. .state
action," 51 and thus, subject to state regulation.
At the same time, however, the Court issued a number of decisions that treated political parties as private organizations that held
First Amendment rights. 52 By recognizing that political parties are
holders of First Amendment rights in some circumstances, the Court
created a dilemma-parties could be both public and private entities
depending on the particular activity in question. 53 If political parties
were truly private organizations, they could exclude whomever they
wished from political participation-a result that would conflict with
43 Daniel Hays Lowenstein, AssociationalRights of MajorPoliticalParties:A SkepticalInquiy, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1741, 1745-46 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
44 See id. at 1748.
45

See id.

46

See id.

47

See AuSTIN RANNEY,CURING THE MISCHIEF OF FACTIoN: PARTY REFORM IN AMERICA 78

(1975).

Id. at 78-79 (quoting V.O. KEv, PoLrrmcs, PARTIES & PREssuee GROUPS 375 (1964)).
Id. at 79-81.
50 Lowenstein, supra note 43, at 1748.
51 Andrew Pierce, Regulating Our Mischievous Factions: PresidentialNominations and the
Law, 78 Ky.LJ. 311, 317 (1990).
52 See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-91 (1975) (holding that freedom of
association protected the right of a national political party to select delegates to a political
convention against a state intervention); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1972) (questioning whether the actions of party committee were state actions).
53 See Lowenstein, supra note 43, at 174849; see also Duke v. Cleland, 87 F.3d 1226,
1231 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that party leaders acted both as state actors and as party
48
49

representatives).
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the "White Primary Cases" in which the Court protected racial minorities' right to participate in party primaries. 5 4 Since overt racial discrimination has subsided in the South, however, courts have limited
the White Primary cases to that specific context and now generally
treat political parties as private actors that are protected by the Constitution, although there are exceptions. 55 The question of when a political party will be treated as a private organization, and therefore not
subject to the Bill of Rights, remains unsettled.56 The Supreme Court
jurisprudence has located political parties "roughly midway between
conventional public and private institutions, attributing to parties elements of both."57 When courts treat parties as private entities, however, they strengthen major-party claims that states may not regulate
their affairs.

54 Cf Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (finding state action when the state enforces exclusion of voters); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (holding that the
use of a discriminatory preprimary election administered by a private association, which
determined the primary winner, constituted state action under the Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (determining that political party's exclusion
of African-American voters in primary constitutes state action); United States v. Classic, 313
U.S. 299 (1941) (holding that Congress can regulate fraud in primary elections); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (finding that party's exclusion of black voters when authorized to determine voter qualifications constitutes state action).
See Michael L. Stokes, When Freedoms Conflict: PartyDisciplineand the FirstAmendment,
55
11 J.L. & POL. 751, 769-72 (1995). However, the Court recently relied on the "White Primary Cases" to find that a political party is a state actor when it delegates authority to a
party to select candidates through a party convention. See Morse v. Republican Party, 116
S. Ct. 1186, 1195-96, 1207-08 (1996) (describing when political parties are state actors and
holding that section 5 of the Voting Rights Acts applies to them).
56 In Republican Party v. Faulkner County, the Eighth Circuit noted that:
The central tension underlying all [associational rights] cases is that of the
public/private distinction: should political parties be treated as private associations of common interest properly free from the intrusive hand of
state regulation, or as quasi-official public institutions integral to the success and stability of American representative democracy, or as something in
between?
49 F.3d 1289, 1292 (8th Cir. 1994); see also Federspiel v. Ohio Republican Party State Cent.
Comm., 85 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that political parties are "private organization[s] occasionally regulated by state law and occasionally delegated state authority").
The public/private distinction still pervades commentators thinking on the state regulation of political parties. SeeJoHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 14.33(b), at 846-50 (4th ed. 1991); Kevin R. Puvalowski, Note, Immune From Review?:
ThresholdIssues in Section 1983 Challengesto the Delegate Selection Proceduresof National Political
Parties, 62 FODHAm L. Rxv. 409, 411-18 (1993) (discussing state action and the White Primary cases). See generallyArthur M. Weisburd, Candidate-Makingand the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party NominatingProcedures, 57 S.CAr L. Rtv. 213
(1984) (analyzing whether party nominations constitute state action).
57 Faulkner,49 F.3d at 1295.
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The freedom of association is centrally a freedom to advance
shared beliefs.5 8 Political parties are large complex organizati6ns. 59
The party determines the content of its "beliefs" (the policies the
party advocates) through the resolution of intraparty disputes with the
application of party rules. 60 Because political parties' freedom of association is a right based on the freedom of speech, 6 1 the major political
parties have sought to insulate these internal processes from state regulation. Thus the scope of political parties' associational rights determines the extent to which the party may pursue its political interests
62
free from state intervention in its affairs.
The freedom of association is best described as a bundle of similar yet disparate and ambiguous rights. First, a political party has the
external right to determine the boundaries of its association, 63 which
includes the freedom to identify the membership of the association
and to exclude others from the association." The right also encompasses a political party's decisions regarding the process for electing
its leaders.6 5 For example, a state cannot compel a national political
party to accept the results of state-run primaries that were adrninis58
See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973); see alsoJulia E. Guttman,
Note, PrimaryElections and the Collective Right of Freedom of Association, 94 YALE LJ. 117, 124
(1984).
59 See WiLLLAMJ. KEEFE, PARTES, PoLrncs AND PUBLIC POLICY INAMERICA 20 (7th ed.
1994).
60 See San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Eu, 826 F.2d 814, 827 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("[T]he right of association would be hollow without a corollary right of selfgovernance.... "), affd, 489 U.S. 214 (1989); see aLso Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) ("[A] party's choice, as among
various ways of governing itself, of the one which seems best calculated to strengthen the
party and advance its interests, deserves the protection of the Constitution ...
61 As Justice Kennedy explains:
The First Amendment embodies a "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open." Political parties have a unique role in serving this principle;
they exist to advance their members' shared political beliefs. A party performs this function in part by "identify[ing] the people who constitute the
association, and ...limit[ing] the association to those people only." Having identified its members, however, a party can give effect to their views
only by selecting and supporting candidates.
Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm., 116 S.Ct. 2309, 2322
(1996) (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
62 See, e.g., Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)
(invalidating statutes regulating internal party organization); Tashjian v. Republican Party,
479 U.S. 208 (1986) (invalidating state law conflicting with state party rule requiring an
open primary).
63 See Eu, 489 U.S. at 224.
64 For example, a state requires a compelling state interest to interfere in the parties'
selection of delegates to party conventions. See Cousins v. Widoga, 419 U.S. 477, 491
(1975).
65 See Eu, 489 U.S. at 229.
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tered in conflict with party rules.6 6 The essence of this right is that a
state "may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for that of
the Party"6 7 or abridge the party's ability "to select 'a standard bearer

' 6
who best represents the party's ideologies and preferences. "'
It remains unclear how far these rights extend in the context of
party regulation. 69 However, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
raised two intertwined and related issues of particular importance: (1)
the extent to which political parties can control the participation of
candidates and individuals whose views conflict with the party establishment, and (2) how much legal power parties have to enact procedures that provide the party with a strong influence over the
nomination of candidates.

2.

The Right To Vote

The second doctrine limiting the state's power to regulate political parties is the "fundamental right" to vote. The Supreme Court
has often invoked dramatic aphorisms to express the importance of
voting in a democracy: "It is beyond cavil that 'voting is of the most
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.' 70 Invalidating a racially biased apportionment scheme, the Court noted
that "[n] o right is more precious in a free country than that of having
66 SeeDemocratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1980). However, it is unclear whether a state-mandated blanket primary, which places all primary candidates on a single ballot and allows participation of all voters without regard to party
affiliation, can withstand a challenge by a party seeking a closed ballot. See O'Callaghan v.
State, 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996) (holding that under Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208, the open
blanket primary statute is constitutional because the system is reasonable and nondiscriminatory), petitionfor cert. fied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3839 (U.S.June 4, 1996) (No. 95-1962); Heavey v.
Chapman, 611 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1980) (holding blanket primaries constitutional because
they encourage voter participation and maximize voter choice). Although these two state
courts have decided otherwise, the results are highly questionable because the state essentially forces parties to allow nonparty members to select its leadership. This fact seems to
go to the heart of a political party's associational rights. See O'Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1268
(Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
67 La Follette, 450 U.S. at 123-24.
68 Eu,489 U.S. at 224 (quoting Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525
F.2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1975)). Underlying the Court's jurisprudence is a desire to encourage parties to elect representative candidates. See id. at 217 n.4 (providing the example of Tom Metzger, a former Grand Dragon of the Ku Klux Klan, winning the Democratic
Party's nomination for the United States House of Representatives). Similarly, the La Follette Court stated that "the inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its collective decisions.., and that political parties may accordingly protect
themselves from 'intrusion by those with adverse political principles.'" 450 U.S. at 122
(citations omitted).
69 See infra Part I.C.1.b. (discussing the recent extension of associational rights).
70
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (quoting Illinois Bd. of Elections v.
Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979)).
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a voice in the election of those who make the laws.... Other rights,
71
even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined."1
Although the court has recognized a constitutionally protected
right to vote, 72 the right lacks a clear basis in the text of the Constitution. 73 The existence of individual voting rights as a substantive limitation on state power to regulate elections evolved from the racial
gerrymandering cases, in which voting districts were drawn with the
purpose of diluting the political power of specific racial groups. 7 4 A
consonance exists between gerrymandering on the basis of race and
the impermissible regulation of minor parties. In gerrymandering
cases, the right purportedly at stake is the right of each voter to have
their vote carry equal weight in determining the composition of the
legislature. 75 The "one man, one vote" principle protects against the
dilution of voting power along gToup lines. 76 Similarly, it is the quality
of individual voters' political participation that defines right-to-vote
controversies in the political party context. 77 Like the pernicious manipulation of district lines, state regulations that interfere with minor
parties' ability to participate in the political process impinge on "the
right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).
SeeAnderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (referring to voting rights of voters
as "fundamental").
73 As Emily Calhoun noted:
Unambiguous guidelines for deciding whether voting is a fundamental
right are not to be found in the text of the Constitution ....On the basis of
the same constitutional text and related historical materials, scholars have
argued both for and against the proposition that the vote is a fundamental
right under the Constitution.
Emily Calhoun, The FirstAmendment and DistributionalVoting Rights Controversies,52 TENN. L
REV.549, 554 (1985). See alsoAdam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 330,
334 (1993) (noting that the right to vote can be based on "several constitutional amendments prohibiting denial of the franchise" or the fundamental rights strand of equal protection analysis). The constitutional basis for the right to vote will vary depending on the
particular context. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist, 395 U.S. 621, 626-29 (1969)
(finding that once a state grants the franchise to residents on a selective basis, the Court
must determine whether the state's distinctions are consistent with the Equal Protection
Clause); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (stating that the
right to vote in federal elections is conferred by Art. I, § 2 of the Constitution).
74 For example, the Supreme Court relied on the gerrymandering decisions when the
Court first struck down a state ballot-access provision challenged by a third party. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 n.8 (1968).
75
See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964).
76 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640 (1993).
77 See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEx. L.
REy. 1705, 1711-12 (1993) (describing voting rights as a right of participation in the political process).
71
72
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their votes effectively." 78 Sometimes the right has been described as
79
the right to a "meaningful" vote.
Although the Court has expansively asserted that the right to vote
is "heavily" burdened when minor parties are denied ballot access, 80
not all voters can be assured that their favored candidate will appear
on the ballot. 8 1 As a result, although in certain contexts courts will
subject any impairment of the fundamental right to vote to strict scrutiny,82 such scrutiny is certainly not the rule when states regulate political parties and minor-party ballot access. 83
C.

Early Court Interventions

In 1968, the Court entered the struggle between states and minor
84
parties decidedly on the minor parties' side. In Williams v. Rhodes,
the Ohio American Independent Party formed to place former Alabama Governor George Wallace on ballot as a presidential candidate,
and in a truly Herculean effort, collected 450,000 signatures-fifteen
percent of the state's voters. 85 Although the party had gathered the
statutorily required number of signatures, it submitted them after a
state-imposed deadline, and thus, the Secretary of State rejected
them.8 6 In a last second appeal challenging the state's action, the
78 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). The case has been the subject of a
considerable amount of debate and criticism. See, e.g., Richard P. Roberts, Note, Ballot Accessfor ThirdParty CandidatesAfterAnderson v. Celebrezze, 3J.L. & POL. 127, 129-31 (noting
the later difficulties Williams caused).
79 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
80 See Williams, 393 U.S. at 31. A number of academic commentators interpreted the
potential reach of the Wdiams decision as creating a right to candidacy that threatened to
invalidate any state regulation that barred a candidate supported by a voter. See Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1111, 1134 (1975) [hereinafter Developments].

See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982).
81 As the Supreme Court recognized, "[A] voter hopes to find on the ballot a candidate who comes near to reflecting his policy preferences on contemporary issues. This
does not mean every voter can be assured that a candidate to his liking will be on the ballot
" Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).

....

See 3 Ronald D. Rotunda &John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 18.31 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995);Jeffrey G. Hamilton, Comment,
82

Deeper into the PoliticalThicket: Racial and PoliticalGerymandering and the Supreme Cour 43

EMORY UJ. 1519, 1558 (1994); see also Deborah S. James, Note, Voter Registration: A Restriction on the FundamentalRight to Vote, 96 YALE L.J. 1615, 1626 (1987) ("In reapportionment,
voter qualification, and candidate ballot access cases, the Supreme Court has affirmed that
'any restriction' on the right to vote triggers heightened scrutiny.").
83 Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432 (noting "the erroneous assumption that a law that imposes
any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny"); see also infra text
accompanying notes 247-60.
84 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See generally Porto,supranote 4, at 289-91 (providing a detailed
discussion of the Williams decision).
85 See Williams, 393 U.S. at 26.
86 The State enacted a deadline for signature petitions nine months before the election. See id. at 26-27.
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Court struck down the "totality of the Ohio restrictive laws,"8 7 holding
that they violated the freedom to associate for the advancement of
political beliefs, and voters' right to vote "effectively."8 8 The Court
applied strict scrutiny, found that the restriction constituted "invidious discrimination, and required the state to put forth compelling interests to justify the restrictions." 9 Williams thus established that the
constitutional rights of minor parties and their supporters imposed a
substantive limitation on states' power to regulate political activity and
political parties.
Over the next fifteen years the Court's scrutiny of state ballot regulations intensified. The Court heard a series of ballot-access challenges involving state-mandated candidate filing fees, 90 large
signature requirements to place candidates' names on the ballot, 91 minor-party nomination procedures, 92 party disaffiliation requirements
for independent candidates, 93 and notarization of petition signatures. 94 Minor parties enjoyed some notable successes invalidating the
most unreasonable state ballot-access restrictions. 95
Soon, however, the Court retreated from the broad implications
of its Williams decision. In Jenness v. Fortson,96 the Court chose not to
apply strict scrutiny and upheld Georgia's requirement that a candidate gather the signatures of five percent of the state's registered voters.97 The Court reasoned that because Georgia's ballot access laws

were less onerous in some ways than Ohio's laws-the state required
signatures from five percent of the electorate as opposed to fifteen
percent-they did not operate to "freeze the status quo" and were
therefore constitutional. 98 In the cases following Williams, the Court
upheld ballot access laws that imposed considerable costs on minor
87
88

Id. at 34.
Id. at 30. The Court relied on an equal protection analysis to assess the constitu-

tionality of the regulations. See id. at 28.
89 Id. at 31-32.
90 See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
91

SeeJenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).

92 See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
93 Party disaffiliation statutes require that an independent candidate be unaffiliated
from a political parties for a certain amount of time before he or she can run. See Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
94 See American Party, 415 U.S. at 785.
95 See infra note 384.
96 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
97 See id. at 440-42.
98 Id. at 438. Although the holdings in Jenness and Williams seem reasonable in light
of the lower percentage of signatures required in Georgia, this fact is deceiving. Georgia's
law was based on registered voters, which is a much larger pool of voters than the number
who voted in the last election. Also, the state required a very successful showing in the
election (20% of the vote) to retain ballot status and required separate petitions for each
candidate. For a more complete discussion of these cases see Smith, Note, supranote 38,
at 181-86.
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parties. 9 9 In addition, these cases created confusion because the
Court failed to specify what level of scrutiny lower courts should apply
in ballot-access challenges.' 0 0
The Court also decided a series of cases brought by the Democrats and Republicans challenging state laws that regulated their internal political activities. These cases did not involve state barriers to
ballot access, but instead involved state laws that "circumscribe [d] the
discretion" of the major political parties to govern themselves without
state interference. 1 1 For example, political parties and voters challenged state laws involving equal representation in party nominations,10 2 the precedence of party rules over state law in delegate
selection, 0 3 and state requirements that voters declare their party af10 4
filiation months ahead of party primaries in order to participate.
These cases defined the early legal interests of the minor and major
parties. Minor parties sought access to the political system on election
day, while the major parties sought freedom from state intervention
into party political activities.
Like the minor parties, the Democrats and Republicans used the
courts to invalidate state restrictions on their activities with mixed success. In general, the Supreme Court upheld mild restrictions on their
associational interests ifjustified by legitimate state interests, while the
Court allowed substantial encroachments upon these rights when necessary to further a compelling state interest. 105 For example, the
Court upheld statutes that prohibited voters from voting in a party
primary unless they had enrolled as a party member eight months
prior to the primary on the grounds that the statutes served the state's
compelling interest in preventing party raiding-the practice of or99 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (remanding to the district court to decide
whether a five-percent (325,000 signatures) petition requirement in California constituted
an undue burden); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (upholding Texas's electoral scheme that required minor parties either to receive two percent of the vote in the
general election or gather signatures from one percent of the state's registered voters).
Commentators observe that these cases present serious difficulties for third parties seeking
ballot access. See, e.g., Smith, Note, supra note 38, at 186 (claiming that Jenness "was a
disaster for third party and independent candidates" because it "set virtually no upper limit
as to how significant a showing of support a state could require before granting access").
100 Jennessnever indicated a standard of review, and Storerand AmericanParty seemed to
apply an mix of minimal and strict scrutiny. See TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1106-08 (analyzing
the courts doctrine in these cases and characterizing the doctrinal inconsistency as
"baffling").
101 TRIBE, supra note 14, § 13-22, at 1112.
102 See Gray v. Sanders, 872 U.S. 368 (1963) (holding that state law creating primary

system violating "one-person, one-vote rule" was invalid).
103 See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (reversing decision allowing seating of
California delegates to better reflect vote distribution in state).
104 See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (holding that twenty-three month affilia-

tion requirement was unconstitutional).
105 See TRIBE, supra note 14, at 111--15.
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ganized groups of voters from one party participating in the election
of another with the hopes of electing a weak candidate.'0 6 Similarly,
the Court allowed some direct interference in parties' internal party
affairs. In Marchioro v. Chaney,'07 for example, the Court upheld a
state law mandating that each major political party establish a state
committee made up of two individuals from each county. 08 At the
same time, the Court did afford the national parties some protection
from state interference. For example, the Court held that the states
could not force national parties to accept the results of primaries that
used procedures in conflict with party rules. 0 9
These cases demonstrate that the Court's early intervention into
the state regulation of political parties did not clearly benefit major
parties over minor parties. As Austin Ranney noted, although the national party received some autonomy from state regulation, it was
clear that "state legislatures [had] the constitutional power to regulate
state and local parties' internal affairs."" 0 At the same time, although
minor parties clearly benefitted from the Court's intervention in striking the most serious legal and clearly antidemocratic barriers to ballot
access, the Court's retreat in Jennessleft the states considerable discretion to frustrate their participation in the political process.
1. Balancing the ConstitutionalRights of Minor PartiesAgainst the
State's Interest in Regulating Elections: Anderson v.

Celebrezze
One problem with the Court's early doctrine in the regulation of
politics was its refusal to establish a clear methodology for resolving
cases involving political parties."'

In Anderson v. Celebrezze," 2 the

Court used the constitutionality of early filing deadlines to articulate a
new mode of analysis in these cases. In late April 1980, John Anderson announced an independent bid for the Presidency. In Ohio, Anderson submitted the required nominating petitions nearly two
months after the statutory deadline for submission had passed." 3
106 See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S 752 (1973). But cf. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51 (1973) (invalidating 23 month period and distinguishing Rosarioon differing amount of
time involved).
107
108

442 U.S. 191 (1979).
See id. at 193-94.

109 See Democratic Partyv. Wisconsin exreL LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (holding that the national party may refuse to seat delegates elected in state-mandated open
primary); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (finding that the national Democratic
Party did not need to seat delegates elected by Illinois state law that conflicted with party
rule at 1972 Democratic National Convention).
110 RANNEY, supra note 47, at 92.
Ill See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 13-20, at 1102-08 (reviewing cases and discussing the
"doctrinal enigmas that bedevil the law of ballot access").
112 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
113

Seeid.at782.
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The Sixth Circuit upheld the deadline, reasoning that it ensured voters had an adequate opportunity to take a close look at the candidates, however, the Supreme Court reversed."14 Declaring the state
laws unconstitutional, the Anderson Court based its conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 1 5 Repeating the
theme from Williams, the Court found that the filing deadline burdened the right of individuals to associate and to cast their votes effectively. 1 6 Again, the right to vote was "heavily burdened" if a voter
could only vote for major-party candidates when other parties or can117
didates were competing for the ballot.
In an attempt to clarify the analysis, the Court formulated the
following balancing test:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. It... must then identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only
determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it
also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights. Only after weighing all these
factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the
challenged provision is unconstitutional. 118
Noting that constitutional challenges to election laws "cannot be
resolved by any 'litmus-paper test," ' 119 the Court concluded that the
deadline limited the choices for disaffected voters reacting to issues
that emerged late in a campaign. 12 0 In addition, the deadline placed
See id. at 783-86.
115 Unlike Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), the Court did not engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause analysis. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 n.7. The Court did,
however, explicitly rely on previous cases applying the "fundamental rights" strand of the
equal protection analysis. See id. (citing cases). Some commentators assert that the Anderson court abandoned the equal protection analysis of ballot access restrictions. See Porto,
supranote 4, at 301;Jacqueline Ricciani, Note, Burdick v. Takushi: TheAnderson Balancing
Test to Sustain Prohibitionson Write-in Voting, 13 PACE L. REv. 949, 965 (1994). Since Anderson, however, a number of courts have utilized equal protection analysis to scrutinize state
election laws. SeeFulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing cases and
discussing the ambiguities in Anderson that seem to allow equal protection challenges to
state election law, but subsuming such claims under the Anderson balancing test); Manifold
v. Blunt, 493 F.2d 1368, 1373 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting the confusion over the appropriate
standard of review and applying strict scrutiny to an equal protection challenge to filing
dates for minor parties).
116
See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787.
114

117

See id.

118 Id. at 789. The test enunciated in Anderson was a striking departure from the
Court's earlier approach. See Richard P. Roberts, Note, Ballot Access for Third Party and Independent CandidatesAfterAnderson v. Celebrezze, 3J.L. & POL. 127, 132-34 (1986) (reviewing the history of Anderson).
119 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
120
See id. at 792.
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a disproportionate burden on political groups whose members shared
a particular viewpoint and associational preference, and thus, was difficult to justify-" [i] t discriminates against . . . those voters whose
2
political preferences lie outside the existing political parties."' '
Despite the Court's apparently powerful rhetoric concerning the
rights of third parties, and compared with the Court's application of
strict scrutiny in Williams, the due process approach "balance[s] State
interests against voters' First Amendment rights instead of almost automatically subordinating the former to the latter." 12 2 When the
Court later upheld Hawaii's ban on write-in voting in Burdick v.
Takushi' 23 in 1992, holding that the ban imposed a "limited burden"
on the right to vote, the Court expounded further on the application
of the Anderson test:
[When minor party] rights are subjected to "severe" restrictions, the
regulation must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance." But when a state election law provision
imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" ... "the
State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify" the restrictions.'

24

Following Burdick, the Anderson balancing test has been described
as a three-tiered model of analysis, in which severely burdensome restrictions receive strict scrutiny, less problematic laws serving legitimate state objectives are balanced against the party's or voter's
interests, and rational basis review is used for other more benign regulations. 125 The central issue in this analysis is how the courts characId. at 793-94. Against this injury, the Court weighed the state's interest in (1) voter
121
education, (2) equal treatment of all candidates, and (3) political stability. The Court
rejected these interests, claiming either that they had no merit, or were not advanced by
the early deadline. See id. at 796-806.
Porto, supranote 4, at 302.
122
123

504 U.S. 428.

Id. at 433 (citation omitted).
125
See Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
ConstitutionalDoctrine,45 HAs-iNGs L.J. 867, 917 (1994); see also McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1221 n.6 (4th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Burdick to mean
that a "regulation which imposes only moderate burdens could well fMil the Anderson balancing test when the interests that it serves are minor"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
Considerable disagreement exists over whether Burdick creates a three- or two-tiered
model, or a pure balancing test. Some courts either apply strict scrutiny or inquire
whether the law is "reasonable." These courts do not indicate whether there is a "middle"
level of review. See, e.g., Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 1994); Duke v. Smith, 13
F.3d 388, 394 (11th Cir. 1994); Signorelli v. New York State Bd. of Elections, No. 95-CV1026, 1995 WL 548712, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 1995). Similarly, some courts do not
indicate whether there is a middle level of review, but appear to interpret "reasonable and
non-discriminatory" to mean traditional minimal scrutiny. See, e.g., Libertarian Party v.
Munro, 31 F.3d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1994); Fulani v. Krivanek, 973 F.2d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir.
1992); New Alliance Party v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 861 F. Supp. 282, 294
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). Finally, some courts hold that the scrutiny a law receives is directly pro124
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terize the burden a statute imposes on the major or minor party.
However, the new test appeared to strengthen the hand of the state in
regulating minor political parties because it required a showing that
the law "severely" burdened a party's interest-a showing that clearly
required more than the ability of the party faithful to vote for their
chosen candidate.
a. The Application of Anderson to State Laws Regulating Minor
Parties
Following Anderson, the Supreme Court intervened to protect the
interests of minor parties only when the state law at issue was arguably
irrational or served no legitimate purpose. The Court upheld state
laws burdening minor parties as long as they were rationally related to
the state's interest in controlling "frivolous" candidacies.' 26 In Norman
v. Reed,1 27 the Harold Washington Party challenged an Illinois law that
required a new party to gather 25,000 nominating signatures in both
electoral districts of a county. 128 The party had gathered a total of
50,000 signatures as required, but only 8,000 were obtained in one of
the districts. The state supreme court rejected the nominating Illinois
petitions, 129 which disqualified the entire state of the party's candidates. Although the Court did not disapprove of the absolute number
of signatures required, the Court struck down the law because it required more signatures for a candidate to enter a local election than a
statewide election.' 3 0 If collecting 25,000 signatures established the
required showing of electoral support for ballot access in a statewide
race, the Court reasoned that the state did not have a strong interest
in requiring more for a local race.' 3 1 By comparison, in Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,'3 2 the Court upheld Washington's system that required that minor-party candidates receive one percent of the total
vote in a statewide open primary before being placed on the general
election ballot.'3 3 Although the system effectively eliminated minor
parties from the general election ballot-only one minor-party candidate ever had achieved ballot status under the system134 ---the Court
did not consider the scheme burdensome because the system proportional to the burden it imposes on a minor party. See, e.g., Patriot Party v. Mitchell, 826
F. Supp. 926, 934 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
126
See Porto, supranote 4, at 808-10.
127 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
128 See id. at 282-87.
129
130

See id. at 284.
See id. at 293.

131 See id. (noting that "it requires elusive logic to demonstrate a serious state interest
in demanding such a distribution for new local parties").
132 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
133 See 3 Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 82, § 18.32, at 424.
134 See Munro, 479 U.S. at 196-97.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:109

vided at least some access to a statewide ballot, even if it was not in the
general election.18 5 These cases provided little protection for minor
party interests against state regulation because under Anderson a law
imposed a severe burden only when clearly irrational, but an electoral
scheme could survive even if it precluded all minor-party candidates
from qualifying for the general election ballot.
b.

The Application of Anderson to State Laws Regulating Major
Parties

Since Anderson, the Court has relied on the associational rights of
major parties to invalidate state laws that interfere with the Democratic and Republican parties' political activities. These cases contrast
sharply with the treatment of minor parties under the doctrine. In
3 6 the Court explicitly relied on the associTashjian v. RepublicanPaty,1
ational rights of parties to invalidate a Connecticut law that required
the major political parties to hold "closed" primaries in which only
party members were allowed to participate.' 37 Later, in Eu v. San
Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,13 8 the Court invalidated a
series of California laws that heavily regulated the internal organizational structure of political parties and prohibited the party from making endorsements in party primaries.' 3 9 Because the statutes limited
how the party organized itself, they "burdened" the party's associational rights, and therefore, the Court required the state to articulate
a compelling interest.14 ° Notably, the Court failed to clearly articulate
the severity of the burden imposed by the regulations, which usually
determines whether the Court applies strict scrutiny.' 4 ' As a result,
some lower courts have read Eu as requiring a lower burden to invoke
strict scrutiny in party autonomy cases.142 These cases introduced a
distinction into the Supreme Court's jurisprudence: the Court clearly
applied strict scrutiny to state laws that regulated the internal affairs of
major state political parties and restricted their political activities, but
it applied an easier standard when minor parties challenged ballot
135

136
137
138
139
140
141

142

See id. at 206 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
479 U.S. 208 (1986).
See id. at 214.
489 U.S. 214 (1989).
See id. at 229.
See id. at 229-31.
See id.
See Republican Party v. Faulkner County, 49 F.3d 1289, 1297 (8th Cir. 1995)

("[T]he Supreme Court has suggested that a law which imposes any appreciableburden on
rights of association, expression and voting demands strict scrutiny ....") (emphasis added) (citing Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222
(1989)). Because of this uncertainty, some courts still express concern over what standard
to apply. See, e.g., Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511, 517 (N.D. Ga. 1995) ("Though the
court does not believe plaintiffs' rights were 'heavily burdened,' the court recognizes that
...a contrary interpretation might not obtain."), aff'd, 87 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 1996).
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access laws, unless those laws were irrational or served no legitimate

purpose.
D.

The Lower Courts Use of Associational Rights and Right-toVote Doctrine to Protect the Interests of the Major
Political Parties

Recent courts of appeals decisions applying both the Supreme
Court's right-to-vote and First Amendment jurisprudence have
strengthened the major party organizations as political actors. As late
as the 1970s, popular participation in party primaries was of little
political consequence and the party leadership held considerable sway
over the nominating process. 143 In other words, candidates were not
elected without the support of the party leadership.14 4 The broad enactment of direct primaries, in which a party's members vote to select
nominees, seriously damaged the influence of state parties in the electoral process by "taking away control over its most precious possession,
the right to bear its label."' 45 Among other unintended effects, the
direct primary system made it difficult for the party to influence candidates with independent power bases and created "opportunities for
people hostile to party leadership and party policies to capture nominations." 146 By the late 1970s, political scientists concluded that, for a
variety of reasons, parties were "declining, decaying or atrophyi.g,' 1 47
and had lost most of their influence in candidate nominations. 148 In
response, in the early 1980s, the major parties started to reform their
internal processes in order to increase their influence in the nomination process. 49 Because many state regulations restricted the parties'
electoral activities, they needed to accompany these reforms with a
legal strategy designed to "use the courts as the instruments of
deregulation." 150
The three cases reviewed in this section illustrate that the legal
strategy is paying political dividends. Relying on Eu and Tashjian,
lower federal courts recently utilized the associational rights cases to
143

See K

ErE,
supra note 59, at 115 (noting that candidates "spent much of their time

cultivating key state party leaders," and "[p]residential nominees were chosen in a relatively closed system from among a very select group").
144 See REICHLm', supra note 6, at 140-60 (describing "machine" politics).
145
146

147

RANNEY, supra note 47, at 125.
KEEFE, supra note 59, at 94-95.

Ceaser, supranote 5, at 87.
See id. at 103-06.
149
In the presidential primaries, these reforms included setting aside unpledged delegates for party leaders and elected officials selected outside the state primaries and dropping the requirement of proportional representation when delegates are awarded. See id.
at 110.
150 Ceaser, supranote 5, at 128; see also Lowenstein, supra note 43, at 1744 (noting the
"use of litigation to expand the immunity of parties from state regulation").
148

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:109

strengthen the ability of major parties to exclude voters and candidates with views inconsistent with the party's ideology, resist state laws
that usurp the party's control over its internal affairs, and increase
party influence in the nomination process.
1.

The Constitutionality of State Candidate Committees: Duke v.
Cleland

The Eleventh Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether
political parties can exclude from participation in party primaries candidates who hold views that are inconsistent with the party's ideology.
In Duke v. Cleland,15 1 the Eleventh Circuit relied on political parties'
associational rights to approve the use of state presidential candidate
selection committees to control candidate access to the party primary
ballot.1 5 2 Under Georgia state law, a committee comprised of the
party's two leaders in the legislature and the chairperson of the state
party chooses which names are placed on the primary ballot. 153 If all
three party members on the committee agree that a name should not
be put on the ballot, the Secretary of State simply does not print the
54
name on the ballot.'
Before the 1992 Georgia Republican Presidential Primary, David
Duke, a former Ku Klux Klan member and white supremacist, sought
to participate in the election, but the party committee voted to reject
his attempt to gain access to the ballot. 155 Duke claimed that his associational rights, and the rights of his supporters to vote for him, were
violated because "the Republican members of the Committee excluded [him] from the Republican primary ballot because of his polit151 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).
152 See id. at 1533. The procedural history of Duke v. Clelandis tortured and complex.
First, Duke claimed that the actions by the State Committee and the Secretary of State
violated his constitutional rights, and requested a temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction, and permanent injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to prevent the printing
of the primary ballots. The district court denied the temporary restraining order and the
injunction. See Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600 (N.D. Ga.), afj'd, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th
Cir. 1992) (Duke 1). Duke then filed an amended complaint and asserted an additional
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that challenged the validity of the Georgia presidential primary candidate selection statute itself. See Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399 (11th Cir. 1993)
(Duke 17). The district court dismissed the case on the ground that there was no state
action, but this finding was overturned on appeal. The court of appeals found that the
candidate selection committee was "an arm of the state" and thus their decision constituted state action, but the court could not decide the merits of the action on the record
provided by the lower court. See id.at 1404-06. On remand, the district court held that the
candidate selection statute was constitutional, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. See Duke
v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511, 517 (N.D. Ga. 1995), afr'd sub nom. Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d
1226 (11th Cir. 1996) (Duke.7l).
153 See Duke, 954 F.2d at 1533.
154 Se id.
155 See id. at 1527.
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ical beliefs."' 56 The essential issue in the case was simple: did the
party's right to determine the boundaries of its association trump
15 7
Duke's right to associate with the party of his choice?
The Eleventh Circuit resolved this conflict squarely in the party's
favor. According to the Court, the Republican party's right to identify
its own associational boundaries meant that Duke himself had no
right to associate with the party. 158 To support its analysis the court
cited DemocraticParty v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,159 for the proposition that states have a strong interest in protecting political parties
from "adverse political principles," 16 0 and in "maintaining the autonomy of political parties."' 61 The court rejected Duke's supporters'
claim that his exclusion burdened their right to vote, by noting that
they could vote for him as an independent or third-party candidate,
although as a factual matter this was not entirely clear. 16 2 The Court
noted further that "a strong argument could be made that there is no
right to vote for any particular candidate in a party primary, because
the party has a right to select its candidates."' 6 3 The statute vindicated
state interests that were "legitimate and compelling"; thus, even under
strict scrutiny, the party and state were likely to prevail.' 64 The court
concluded, "Duke [had] no right to associate with the Republican
Party if the Republican Party ha[d] identified Duke as ideologically
1 65
outside the party."
156 Id. at 1530. The Georgia Republican Party Chairman, Alec Poitevint, admitted that
the party denied Duke because of his political views: "'There is no room for disciples of
Hitler on the Republican presidential ballot.'" Duke, 5 F.3d at 1404 n.5. 1993).
157 See id.
158 See id. at 1532.
159 The actual holding of the case was that a national party organization could refuse
to recognize delegates selected in an open primary that allowed the participation of non-

party voters. 450 U.S. 107, 123-24 (1981).
160 Duke, 954 F.2d at 1532.
161 Id. at 1531.
162

163

See id.

Id. at 1531 n.6.
164
See id. at 1530.
165 Id. at 1531. On appeal from Duke II,a different Eleventh Circuit panel (Judges
Hatchett, Henderson and Mills) took the same position. See Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226,
1234 (11th Cir. 1996). Political scientists consider political affiliation entirely self-designated, but the Duke decision raises the question of whether this conclusion is accurate.
Austin Ranney wrote in 1975: "IYmou are a Democrat if you say you are; no one can effectively say that you are not; and you can become a Republican any time the spirit moves you
simply by saying you have become one." RAum', supra note 47, at 166. However, the
district court took a contrary position. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
("If the Republican Party determines that a person is not a bona fide party member or
holds views adverse to party principles, then the interest of facilitating party voting is not
affected by the exclusion from the ballot of a non-party member."); see also Marchitto v.
Knapp, 807 F. Supp. 916, 918 (D. Conn. 1993) (upholding a state statute that authorized
the removal of voters from the party's roles for two years upon a showing that the voters
did not support the party's principles). But see Fand v. Legnard, No. 3S160 63, 1994 WL
613423, at "5-10 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1994) (awarding an injunction against the
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The Duke court subtly extended the party's associational rights by
allowing the state to protect one part of the party against another part
of the party, rather than forcing the party to resolve a political dispute
through its own internal political process. 16 6 A close examination of
the associational rights case law reveals that these cases involved
strengthening the ability of the party to resolve intraparty disputes politically by invalidating state laws that interfered with the party's candidate selection processes. 167 When the Supreme Court invalidated
California's ban on primary endorsements in Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Committee,168 for example, the decision

demonstrated that a party has a First Amendment right to select its
candidates by campaigning within the party against candidates it finds
.do not adequately represent the party.169 In contrast, in this case, the
party excluded Duke without resorting to the party's internal political
processes. 170 The exclusion took place before any party members
were involved (except the three path leaders). Under Duke, a major
party can deny primary ballot access to a major-party primary by the
vote of three party members invested with that power under state
law.

17 1

removal of a voter from the party roles because the Connecticut disaffiliation statute burdens associational rights).
166 Republican party members wished to place Duke's name on the ballot. Duk/ 954
F.2d at 1528 n.3.
167 Cousins v. Wgoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) and Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex re. La
Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) enabled the national party to accept or reject the results
of state-run elections that did not comply with its own rules. This independence from the
state strengthened a party's ability to resolve internal disputes through its own political
process. As Professor Lowenstein's noted, "[in sum, the pre-Tashjiancases were susceptible to a number of plausible interpretations, but they are striking for their consistent rejection ofjudicial resolution of intraparty disputes." Lowenstein, supra note 43, at 1777.
168 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
169
See id. at 224-25; see also Duke, 954 F.2d at 1538 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
170
As Judge Kravitch noted in dissent, if the associational rights of the political party
permitted the "exclusion of candidates from a primary ballot, the very purpose of a primary would disappear." Duke, 954 F.2d at 1539 (Kravitch, J., dissenting). In conclusion,
she summed up the real motivation behind the party's actions:
The Republican Party of Georgia and the state seek to exclude Duke from
the primary ballot because they believe that the party will suffer embarrassment and adverse publicity by virtue of his candidacy for the Republican
nomination. No political body, however, has a constitutional right to freedom from embarrassment ....
Id. at 1539.
171 In a separate but similar case, Duke successfully challenged Florida's Presidential
Candidate Selection Committees under the vagueness doctrine. See Duke v. Smith, 13 F.3d
388 (11th Cir. 1994) (striking Florida statute on vagueness grounds because it failed to
provide a procedure for reconsideration of candidate requests to be placed on the ballot).
However, on remand in Duke MI,the district court held that the Georgia statute survived
this analysis because the vote of three party members constituted a "protective mechanism"
sufficient to avoid the vagueness problem. Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga.
1995).
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Duke v. Cleland creates some tension with the Supreme Court's
recent analysis of its own ballot access jurisprudence. In U.S. Term
Limits v. Thornton,172 the Court held that Amendment seventy-three to
the Arkansas Constitution, which required multiple-term incumbents
to run only as write-in candidates, constituted an impermissible exercise of the state's power to regulate elections. 173 Discussing its ballot
access jurisprudence, the Court noted that these cases "did not involve
measures that exclude[d] candidates from the ballot without reference to the candidates' support in the electoral process." 174 Yet, the
Eleventh Circuit allowed the party acting under state law to achieve
precisely this result by excluding a candidate from participating in primary elections-the very means used to determine a candidate's
support. 175
The case is also a strange application of the "party autonomy"
concept. It is less than clear how a state procedure enabling state officials to remove party candidates protects that party's autonomy.
Rather, such a statute infringes on that autonomy. Notably, when
Duke brought a practically identical lawsuit challenging Florida's candidate selection committee in Duke v Smith, 176 the Eleventh Circuit
strongly implied that the courts could not review a candidate's exclusion if the party removed Duke without the state's involvement. As
discussed earlier, a political party must respect the constitutional
The presence of subjectivity in primary election law has been the subject of considerable conflict in the federal courts. Excluded candidates have challenged the use of media
recognition statutes, which allow the Secretary of State complete discretion to determine
candidate access to party primaries based on whether the candidate is "generally recognized" as a presidential contender within the party or the media, but require minor parties
or other candidates to collect signatures to gain ballot access. These procedures, therefore, give already strong candidates a "free pass" to the ballot. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 9-465 (West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 34-732(1) (1993); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 53,
§ 70E (West 1993). Some challenges to these statutes on void-for-vagueness grounds have
been successful. See Duke v. Connell, 790 F. Supp. 50 (D.R.I. 1992). But, more often,
courts have been unwilling to strike the laws. See Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809 (6th Cir.
1980); LaRouche v. Kezer, 787 F. Supp. 298 (D. Conn. 1992), rev'd in par4 990 F.2d 36 (2d
Cir. 1993); LaRouche v. Sheehan, 591 F. Supp. 917 (D. Md. 1984). See generally Matelson,
Note, supranote 14, at 1250-56 (providing a complete analysis of the case law under vagueness doctrine). Duke based his claim in Georgia on the conflict between his associational
rights, the right to vote, and the associational rights of the party. The doctrinal bases of
the decisions differ, and the vagueness doctrine is therefore beyond the scope of this Note.
172 115 S.Ct. 1842 (1995).
173 See id. at 1868-71.
174 Id. at 1870.
175 Under the Georgia and Florida statutes the three party elders would have the same
power to eliminate incumbents from consideration, as they had to eliminate Duke. See
Duke, 954 F.2d at 1539 n.10 (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (noting that the state and party
claimed that the Republican Party could have excluded, without explanation, all candidates but George Bush from the Republican Party primary).
176 13 F.3d 388 (11th Cir. 1994).
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rights of individuals only in circumstances when it is a state actor.' 77
The court found that the committee's action was state action because
the statute establishing the committee was a "state-created procedure[ ], not the autonomous political parties, mak[ing] the final determination as to who will appear on the ballot in each primary
election.' 7 8 Furthermore, the court found state action because the
statute did not leave the parties the discretion to review the candidate's placement on the ballot' 179 This analysis implies that if the
party excluded Duke without state involvement, it would not have violated Duke's constitutional rights because a political party in that action is a private organization to which the Bill of Rights does not

apply.' 8 0

In short, the Eleventh Circuit's application of the associational
rights case law in Duke is problematic. The case nevertheless represents a significant grant of political discretion to the state party leadership to control candidate access to the party and demonstrates the
reach of the Supreme Court's party-autonomy jurisprudence. If the
party can eliminate David Duke on the basis of his political beliefs, the
party can eliminate other candidates on the same grounds. As the
Eleventh Circuit recognized, "The Committee may exclude nationally
recognized candidates for any reason or no reason at all."'181
Although parties are unlikely to exercise this power because in most
circumstances such action would be politically awkward, the decision
increases the party's ability to restrict access to the party apparatus by
candidates hostile to the party's ideology. In addition, the decision
clearly reflects a view that a party's rights are superior to the rights of
individuals who wish to join it. In this way, the associational rights
doctrine and the right-to-vote doctrine enabled the party to neutralize

177

178
179
180

See supra text accompanying notes 44-57.
Smith, 13 F.3d at 393.
See id.

Cf Federspiel v. Ohio Republican Party State Cent. Comm., 867 F. Supp. 617, 620
(S.D. Ohio 1994) (dismissing case and finding no state action when party members challenged party election), affd, 85 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Duke challenged actions
taken by a party committee, it was unclear how the party's associational rights were involved if the committee was a state actor. In Duke 1T, the Eleventh Circuit determined that
the Committee's decision as a whole constituted state action. Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399
(11th Cir. 1993). In Duke II, the district court concluded that three party members on the
committee simultaneously acted as party representatives, "and therefore also wore a party
hat at the time of the decision," Duke v. Cleland, 884 F. Supp. 511, 515 n.2 (N.D. Ga.
1995), and the Eleventh Circuit agreed, Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir.
1996). Thus, the individuals were both state actors, to whom the Bill of Rights applied,
and non-state actors, to whom the Bill of Rights did not apply, at the same time.
181 Duke, 5 F.3d at 1403.
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and to increase

Limits on State Control Over the NominationProcess: Republican
Party v. Faulkner County

The expansion of political party associational rights has also
strengthened the major parties' ability to challenge state laws regulating their internal affairs, particularly in the nomination process. In
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic CentralCommittee, the Court established that states are limited in their ability to demand specific internal structures for state party organizations.' 8 3 At issue were California
statutes that required, for example, that the chair of the state central
committee rotate between residents of northern and southern California, specified membership of the parties' governing bodies, and established the dues committee members must pay.' 8 4 In simplified terms,
the California state legislature was dictating the details of the party's
organizational structure. These statutes burdened the party's associational rights by "limit[ing] the party's discretion in how to organize
itself ... [and associate] with one another in freely choosing their
parties' leaders." 8 5
To survive strict scrutiny, the Court required California to advance a compelling interest for these regulations. Finding none, the
Court distinguished statutes that directly regulate the party's leaders
from ballot access statutes, which infringe the associational rights of
the parties indirectly to ensure order and fairness in elections.' 86 In
future cases, states defending statutes that regulate internal party affairs will need affirmatively to show that "such regulation is necessary
to ensure an election that is orderly and fair."' 8 7 Because many states
heavily regulate the major political parties, 8 8 these parties can use Eu
to challenge state laws that weaken the parties as political actors.
In Republican Party v. Faulkner County,'8 9 the Eighth Circuit recently demonstrated this application of the associational rights doctrine by invalidating on constitutional grounds a state law that
required the major parties to conduct and fund a primary election. 190
In Faulkner,an Arkansas statute required "organized political parties"
182
See infra text accompanying notes 496-99 (discussing party weakness in the direct
primary system).
183
489 U.S. 214, 280 (1989).
184
See id. at 218-19.

185

Id. at 230-81.

See id. at 231-32.
Id. at 233.
188 See KEx_, supranote 59, at 51-52 (identifying two general bodies of state law: laws
regulating nominations and elections and those affecting party cohesion in government).
189 49 F.3d 1289 (8th Cir. 1995).
190 See id. at 1294.
186
187
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to certify that a candidate for the general election received either a
majority of votes or ran unopposed at the party primary, and to pay
the expenses of organizing and conducting their own primary.' 9 '
First, the court read Eu as establishing a general rule: "In essence, the
internal affairs of political parties are off-limits to state regulation, un1 92
less the state finds it necessary to meet a compelling state interest."
Thus, the court felt that even under the flexible Anderson/Burdick analysis, strict scrutiny applied. 193 To defend the scheme, the state proffered four interests: (1) protecting the integrity of the nominating
process, (2) minimizing voter confusion, (3) preventing frivolous candidacies, and (4) ensuring that the winning candidate will receive a
majority of the vote. 19 4 The problem was that the Republican Party
could only afford to pay for a small number of polling places. The
party demonstrated that, as a result, voters either could not find a
Republican polling place or arrived at Democratic polling places and
voted in that election rather than find the correct location. 9 5 These
problems "severely burdened" the right of party members to vote and
the Republican Party's ability to reach all persons wishing to vote in
their primary.' 96 The scheme actually undermined the state's asserted
interests: an electoral scheme that caused Republican voters to vote in
the Democratic Primary did not minimize voter confusion or protect
the integrity of the voting system. In essence, the party's rights were
severely burdened by the party's inability to pay for its primary, leaving the state the choice of requiring no primary at all or paying for
one.
Faulkner is significant because the Eighth Circuit used associational rights as a substantive limit on the state's ability to dictate a
party's nominating procedures. 97 A state can violate a political
party's associational rights if the state enacts a primary election system
that unduly burdens the party's association with its members. Moreover, the court reached this conclusion by considering the actual impact of the nominating procedure on the party's campaign
192
193

See id.
Id. at 1294.
See id.at 1297.

194

See id.at 1299.

195

See id.
at 1298.

196
197

See id.

191

Cf.Lowenstein, supranote 43, at 1276-77 (noting that the same logic used to decide
Eu and Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 214 (1989), could be extended to prohibit
states from requiring party primaries, but the Court is very unlikely to support such a finding). For the arguments supporting party autonomy in nominating procedures, see Weisburd, supra note 56, at 214 (claiming "statutes requiring parties to use particular
nominating methods are of doubtful constitutionality"); see also Karl D. Cooper, Note, Are
State-Imposed Political Party Primaries Constitutional?: The ConstitutionalRamifications of the
1986 Illinois LaRouche Primary Victories, 4J.L. & Pot. 343, 373 (1987) (presenting the argument that state-mandated primaries violate parties' associational rights).
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activities. 198 Thus, Faulknersuggests that courts balancing the burdens
imposed by an election scheme must consider evidence demonstrating that a scheme actually interferes with the party's ability to organize
and campaign effectively. 199 If the party can produce sufficient evidence, they can object to a state-dictated candidate selection method
and the state must have a compelling justification for its electoral
scheme. This holding also represents the first step in what remains an
important question for political parties: can the state mandate that a
party hold a primary rather than a convention if the party can demon200
strate that a forced primary interferes with its associational rights?
3.

IncreasingMajorParty Influence in CandidateNominations
Through Primary Ballot Access Laws: Rockefeller v.
Powers

In addition to the development of associational rights, the
Supreme Court's ballot access cases applying right-to-vote doctrine
also has enabled the major parties to increase their influence as political actors. First, the Court has consistently approved the states' use of
ballot access restrictions to keep minor-party candidates off the ballot,
which reduces political competition and simplifies their political environment.2 0 1 Second, in Burdick v. Takushi,20 2 the Supreme Court determined that the actual choice presented to voters under a state's
electoral laws receives little weight when determining the constitutionality of an election statute.2 03 Relying on these holdings, major parties
198 The court stressed the facts found by the district court: the disparity in the number
of polling places available to Republican voters, the fact that the number of voters who
voted in the Democratic primary exceeded the number in the general election, and the
suggestion that the electoral scheme was motivated by a desire to preserve Democratic
partisan advantage. See Faulkner,49 F.3d at 1298.
199 A minor party has made this very claim, but was not as successful. In Green Party v.
Jones, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), a state court held that the state could
ignore a party rule requiring any candidate seeking access to the ballot in the party's primary to also seek approval at a party convention. Such a rule enabled the exclusion of a
party nominee if a majority of the party's voting members supported it, thereby ensuring
that the party's ballot access could not be used in a manner contrary to party principles
and ideologies. See id. at 409-411. The court rejected the party's attempt to control its
candidate selection procedures, holding that potential injury represented by the possibility
of allowing candidates with hostile ideologies did not strongly implicate the party's associational interests. See id. at 415. This case seems in considerable conflict with both the
Supreme Court's decisions in Eu and Tashjian, as well as the Eighth Circuit's decision in
Faulkner,and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cleland.
200 The Court has never, fully addressed the question. See infra note 268. However,
Justice Scalia has made clear that he does not think that associational rights extend this far,
and thus, he would presumably not agree with Faulkner. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 235
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
201
See infra Part II.B.
202 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
203 See infra text accompanying notes 248-60 (discussing the Court's opinion upholding Hawaii's ban on write-in voting in Burdick).
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can enact primary ballot access laws to provide. significant advantages
to candidates favored by the state party organization without infringing on the constitutional rights of excluded party candidates or their
supporters.
In Rockefeller v. Powers,20 4 the Second Circuit upheld a state statute, enacted at the request of the party, that established a system of
presidential primary elections in which separate delegates were
elected to represent each of the state's thirty-one Congressional districts. 2 05 In other words, the statute created thirty-one separate presidential primary elections. A separate statute controlled ballot access
and required that each candidate gather signatures from the lesser of
five percent or 1250 enrolled party voters in each congressional district.20 6 Republican voters supporting Steve Forbes sued after he
failed to satisfy this requirement in a minority of districts, 20 7 claiming
that the signature requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause
because it caused fewer candidates to qualify for the ballot in small
districts than in more populous districts.20 8 According to the plaintiffs, the 1250 signature cap eased the burden of collecting signatures
in heavily Republican suburban and rural districts, 209 but the five percent requirement required a comparatively larger percentage of voters in urban districts where, "'a Petitioner-carrier could wait for a
week on Flatbush Avenue and not encounter a single Brooklyn Republican!"' 210 As a result, fewer candidates collected the required signatures in these less populous districts, and voters who lived there had
2 11
fewer candidates from whom to choose.
The plaintiffs challenged the statute under the First Amendment
as well 2 12 but the district court, in awarding them a preliminary injunction, focused on the equal protection claim.21 3 The district court
204
205

206

74 F.3d 1367 (2d Cir. 1996).
See id. at 1370-71.
See id.

See id. at 1373 n.11.
See id. at 1371-72. In heavily Republican districts, capping the signature requirement at 1250 resulted in candidates actually needing to gather far less than five percent of
the registered voters. In the most heavily Republican district, for example, there were
158,097 registered Republicans. A five percent requirement in this district would result in
7905 signatures. When the 1250 signature cap applied, the actual percent required
dropped to 0.79%. In less Republican districts, however, the five percent requirement
determined the amount of signatures required. See id.
207
208

209
210

See id.
Id. at 1372.

211 To prove the impact on voter choice, the plaintiffs documented that in the 1988
primary, although there were four major contenders for the Republican nomination
(George Bush, Robert Dole,Jack Kemp, and Pat Robertson), in the eight districts with the
fewest Republicans, only Bush appeared on the ballot in four, and only Bush and one
other candidate appeared in the other four. See id.
212 See id. at 1370.
213 See Rockefeller v. Powers, 909 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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analyzed the effect of the signature requirements -onvoter choice, noting that the only justification for imposing a higher signature burden
in less populous districts was "a desire to increase the advantage already enjoyed by the presidential candidate favored by the Party organization." 2 14 Candidates independent of the party organization
were forced to forego petitioning in districts in which it was more difficult to collect signatures. 215 According to the court, without an
adequate choice of candidates, the voters' right to vote was
"meaningless."2 16
The Second Circuit panel comprised of Judges Jacobs, Calabresi,
and Parker reversed, holding that the disparity of signature requirements did not "significantly burden" the voters' "fundamental right to
vote" because the statistical evidence the voters presented did not establish an "appreciable correlation between the number of registered
Republicans and the incidence of 'no choice' (i.e., one or no candidate) ballots."2 17 The Second Circuit claimed that the evidence
showed that the number of "no choice" districts, districts in which no
candidate or a single candidate gained ballot status, appeared to be
randomly distributed throughout the state.2 18 Therefore, these voters
were not discriminated against on this basis. Although there was a
correlation between district size and the presence of more than two
candidates-no more than two of the four serious candidates appeared on the ballot in the fifteen least-Republican districts2 19-this
disparity did not warrant strict scrutiny because a choice of two candidates was a less serious problem than a system that presented no
22 0
choice among candidates.
After this defeat, Forbes renewed the motion for a preliminary
injunction and urged the district court to consider whether the ballot
access laws constituted an undue burden on the right to vote, an issue
that the court did not decide in the first decision. 221 The district
court again awarded the injunction, holding that the ballot access
laws, which required a total of 37,000 signatures across thirty-one electoral districts, constituted an undue burden under Anderson.2 22 The
court based its decision primarily on three arguments. First, the
number of signatures required by New York's ballot access laws in the
presidential primary was "substantially" higher than the presidential
214
215

Id. at 868.

216

Id.
Rockefe!,

217
218

See

id.
74 F.3d at 1379.

See id.

219
220

Se id.
Se id.

221

See Rockefeller, 917 F. Supp. at 159.
See id.at 159-60.

222
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primaries in other states. 223 Second, the fact that the wealthy Forbes
could not qualify in all the districts showed that only candidates who
are favored by the Republican Party would be able to qualify in every
district.2 24 Third, because the statutory scheme allowed parties to use
a .5% signature requirement if they chose to do so, "New York State
has no compelling interest in a more restrictive rule than .5% per
congressional district."225 The court ordered the state to place Forbes
on the ballot in the four congressional districts where he had failed to
gather sufficient valid signatures to qualify. On appeal, a new panel
consisting of Judges Van Graafeiland, Meskill, and Winter perfunctorily affirmed the decision in a two-page opinion that was devoid of any
226
substantive legal analysis.
At first glance this case might appear to be a stinging defeat for
the New York Republican Party and to run counter to this Note's thesis. However, a close examination of the opinion reveals that the decision was based more on the particular inequities Forbes suffered at
the hands of the state party than a reasoned application of the relevant case law. First, District Court Judge Korman's opinion almost
completely ignored the precedent that defines what signature requirements constitute an undue burden on voters' rights under Anderson. 2 27 This case was far from the first challenge to an unreasonable
signature requirement; minor parties have challenged these laws for
decades. For example, in Storerv. Brown, the Supreme Court did not
invalidate a California law that required a minor party to collect
325,000 signatures in twenty-four days. 228 Other state laws requiring
well over 100,000 signatures have been routinely held as not imposing
an undue burden on ballot access. 229 The 37,000 total signatures required in New York-even in light of other stringent technical requirements that New York imposes-are far lower than these minor
party requirements. Although ballot access challenges usually involve
minor parties seeking access to the general election ballot, the cases
are clearly relevant in determining what petition requirements constitute an undue burden in a presidential primary. There is no clear
reason why the effort and resources a major-party candidate must expend to gain ballot access in a state-administered primary election
223
224
225
226
district
227

See id.at 160-62.
See id. at 163-64.
Id. at 164.
The decision cited only one case and basically consisted of a short summary of the
court's opinion. See Rockefeller, 78 F.3d at 44-46.

Although the decision quotes from a number of relevant Supreme Court decisions,
it fails to compare ballot access laws that were found constitutional in those cases to the
New York law except in the most perfunctory way. See, e.g., Rockefeller, 917 F. Supp. at 15965.
228 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 740 (1974).
229

See, e.g., Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 794 (11 th Cir. 1983).
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cannot be compared persuasively to those which a minor-party or independent candidate must expend. In addition, the Second Circuit
had previously upheld a number of technical provisions similar to
those that Judge Korman found objectionable in Rockefeller.23 ° Yet,
none of these cases received more than a passing mention. Without
any attempt to distinguish these cases, the decision is a questionable
one.
Second, Judge Korman inadequately analyzed a central fact in
the case: the Republican Party, not the state, made the decision to
employ the five percent or 1250 signature requirement to determine
which candidates could participate in its primary. 23 ' That the Party
chose this method of qualifying candidates implicates a central associational right-the party's ability to select a "'standard bearer who best
represents the party's ideologies and preferences.' 2 3 2 If, in Duke v.
Cleland, the Republican Party's First Amendment rights protected its
exclusion of David Duke from a presidential primary, 23 3 it seems odd
to say that a state party cannot decide to enact difficult ballot access
requirements. It's the party's choice. Reconciling the two cases creates an anomalous result: a party committee can exercise its decision
to prohibit a candidate from participating in a party primary regardless of her popularity, but it cannot enact a nondiscriminatory rule
that applies equally to all candidates and tests her support in the

party.
230

Compare Unity Party v. Wallace, 707 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding N.Y.

ELEc. LAW § 6-146(1)), withRockefeller, 917 F. Supp. at 161 (citing § 6-134(2) as an example

of a "cumbersome and arcane" rule). In Rockefeller, the district court found it objectionable
that Forbes needed to gather 140% of the statutory requirement to survive challenge. 917
F. Supp. at 162. However, in Schulz v. W'dliams, 44 F.3d 48, 57 (2d Cir. 1994), the court
upheld New York's requirement that each independent nominating petition indicate the
signer's election district, assembly district, or ward even though the candidate needed to
gather 30,000 signatures to obtain the 15,000 statutorily required signatures to safely survive challenges. In addition, a number of other cases upholding New York's ballot access
laws have been decided. See, e.g., Berger v. Acito, 457 F. Supp. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (upholding technical petition requirements). But see Katherine E. Schuelke, Note, A Callfor
Reform of New York State's Ballott Access Laws, 64 N.Y.U. L REv. 182 (1989) (arguing that the
entire New York ballot access system is unconstitutional).
231 The statutory scheme allowed the major parties to choose how many signatures to
require. As the court explained:
While the Legislature has offered each political party the option of
which alternative to choose., the choices merely codify each party's preferred method of ballot access for its primary....
.,.. The rule the Committee chose consistently and decisively advantages the candidate it supports and discourages and disadvantages the candidates it has rejected.
Rockefeller, 917 F. Supp. at 164.
232 Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224 (1989)
(quoting Ripon Society v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
233
See supra text accompanying notes 151-71.
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The district court seemed especially disturbed by the influence
the state party had in the election because the party used its organizational strength to qualify Dole statewide but denied the same assistance to the other candidates. 234 Yet this fact is not relevant to the
constitutionality of the electoral scheme. The Supreme Court has explicitly protected the right of party organizations to campaign actively
in primaries for some party candidates at the expense of other party
candidates.2 35 In Rockefeller, the district court and the Second Circuit
did not even mention the possible associational rights implications
2 6
that the case presents.
Because of the shortcomings in the court's analysis, Rockefeller is
important more for what it shows about ballot access law than about
the substance of its holding. Nonetheless, the decision demonstrates
that under current doctrine, political parties retain considerable leeway to enact rules that restrict participation in party primaries. Despite the court's final decision, the major political parties are
effectively able to influence the outcome of party primaries through
the enactment of ballot access law, even though the right to vote may
provide some limitation on their ability to do so. The New York Republican Party took advantage of what minor parties have known all
along-ballot access laws keep candidates off the ballot. Because the
state party collects the signatures for their favored candidates, the
state party can force candidates it opposes to spend vital resources to
gain ballot access and can eliminate many candidates from competition.237 This power provides a strong incentive for candidates to be
responsive to the party's leadership. 238 Thus, the cases illustrate that
the ballot access case law may benefit the major parties by increasing
their influence in party nominations.
4.

Summary: The Legal Status of the Major Parties

The lower courts' application of the associational rights doctrine
is strengthening major parties' influence in nominations, insulating
234 Rockefeller, 917 F. Supp. at 163 ("[W]ithout the support of the NewYork Republican
State Committee, only the most atypical of candidates, one with unlimited financial resources, can come even close to replicating the unique ability of the favored candidate to
obtain ballot access .... .).
235
See Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 ("Barring political parties from endorsing and opposing
candidates not only burdens their freedom of speech but also infringes upon their freedom of association.").
236
I do not claim that the case is clear either way. However, it seems to be a serious
shortcoming of the courts' analyses that these issues were not considered.
237 Until 1996, two candidates had never appeared on the ballot in all thirty-one congressional districts. Don Van Natta, Jr., Ruling PutsForbes on PrimaryBallot Across New York,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1996, at B8.
238
Cf supra text accompanying notes 181-82 (describing how restricting access to
primaries increases party influence in the nomination process).
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239
the internal processes, of the major parties from state regulation,
and protecting the parties from primary systems that interfere with
their selection of candidates. The question remains open whether the
major parties will seek to take advantage of these legal developments
and create more centralized and powerful political organizations-a
development that the political science community has heralded as a
positive one since 1950.2 40 Many political scientists believe that the
current system of direct primaries, free from party influence, has degraded the quality of party governance.2 41 As Duke, Faulkner,and Rockefeller demonstrate, the associational rights and right-to-vote case law
are potential tools for state party organizations to use to reassert themselves as political actors.
The current Court recently refused an opportunity to delineate
more clearly the limits of the associational rights doctrine. In Morse v.
Republican Party,242 the Court held that section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act (the "Act") requires the preclearance of a delegate registration fee
if a political party selects candidates by convention and state law auto2 43
matically places the candidate on the ballot in the general election.
In the seven states that are subject to that section of the Act, 244 any
change in candidate primary procedures must be precleared by the
Attorney General or the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.? 45 Justice Scalia described why associational rights are potentially threatened by this requirement:

Given that political parties are organized with the near-exclusive
purpose of influencing the outcomes of elections, I think it obvious
that... § 5 requires political parties to submit for prior Government approval, and bear the burden ofjustifying, virtually every decision of consequence regarding their internal operations. That is
the most outrageous tyranny. A freedom of political association
239
See Hietmanis v. Austin, 899 F.2d 521, 529 (6th Cir. 1990) (invalidating state law
that required parties to allow incumbent legislators to sit on county executive committee);
Louisiana Republican Party v. Foster, 674 So. 2d 225, 234 (La. 1996) (holding that election
law that specifies a method for electing party members to state party committee violates
freedom of association).
240
In 1950, the American Political Science Association published a highly influential
report on the role of political parties in American politics. Committee on Political Parties,
American Political Science Ass'n, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, 44 Am. POL.
Sci. RExv. 810 app. (1950). These scholars argued that until parties become "centralized,
disciplined, and cohesive national parties dedicated to formulating, expounding, and implementing policy programs" they will "never play their proper role" in American Democracy. See RuANEx, supra note 47, at 42-44 (summarizing the report).
241
See infra text accompanying notes 497-99.
242 116 S. Ct. 1186 (1996).
243 See id. at 1206.
244 See id. at 1193.
245

See id
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that must await the Government's favorable response to a "Mother,
2 46
may I?" is no freedom of political association at all.
Nonetheless, a divided Court chose to ignore the associational
rights issue raised by the case until the issue was directly litigated in a
future case. 247 As a result, little can be inferred from the Court's
opinion.
E.

The State Regulation of Minor Parties: Exacerbating the
Double Standard

Supposedly, minor parties operate within the same legal framework as major parties; thus, the expansion of associational rights is
equally applicable to them. This Part asserts, however, that in contrast
to major-party claims, minor-party claims that state laws impinge on
their associational rights and the right to vote resulted in only a few
victories of limited political significance under Anderson. First, the implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Burdick v. Takushi are
discussed. Second, minor-party challenges to state statutes regulating
party nomination procedures, party affiliation and voter registration
procedures, and state control over ballot formulation are analyzed.
This Part concludes with a short analysis of the current split in the
circuits over the constitutionality of "anti-fusion" laws-state laws that
prohibit candidates from accepting the nomination of more than one

party.
1.

Burdick v. Takushi

In Burdick, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Hawaii's ban on write-in voting. 2 4 8 Although the case did not directly
involve minor parties, the Court's opinion is significant because it
casts light on how the current Court is likely to analyze electoral laws
that burden the right to vote. The decision has two main implications. First, the Court rejected any notion that voting restrictions implicate free speech concerns as First Amendment expression.
According to the Court, "[a] ttributing to elections a more generalized
expressive function would undermine the ability of states to operate
246 Id. at 1218 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The four dissenting Justices all agreed that the
First Amendment issues should have been discussed because holding that a party's convention fee must be precleared poses serious constitutional problems. See id. at 1220-21 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 1237-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
247 OnlyJustices Stevens and Ginsburgjoined in the Court's opinion, but they simply
dismissed the Party's associational rights claim without analysis. See id. at 1210-11 (noting
that such First Amendment concerns were "hypothetical"). Concurring in the judgment,
Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Souter admitted that "First Amendment questions about
the extent to which the Federal Government ... can regulate the workings of a political
party convention, are difficult ones [which] are properly left for a case that squarely
presents them." Id. at 1215 (Breyer, J., concurring).
248 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438-39 (1992)
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elections fairly and efficiently."24 9 Voting, however, is both an instru-

mental determinait'of political outcomes and a vehicle for communicating expressions of discontent or support for the current political
regime.2 50 Political scientists have noted that because the actual instrumental impact of a single vote is infinitesimally small-the

probability that any single voter can determine the outcome of the
election-the benefits of voting result primarily from the expressive
aspect of the act.25' The expressive quality of voting is especially apparent when that vote is cast for a minor-party candidate with the
chance of electoral success. Before Burdick, the Court recognized that

minor parties are worthy subjects of constitutional protection because
of the political expression they contribute-and the voters who

demonstrate their support of this expression when they vote-to the
marketplace of ideas.2 52 The Burdick decision therefore could be read

as a subtle erosion of one of the prime justifications for the protection
of minor parties.
Second, whether an electoral system provides voters with ade-

quate choice among candidates is given little weight in deciding if the
right to vote is infringed. In Burdick, the voter wished to write-in a

candidate's name because only one candidate qualified for the ballot
in his district.2 5 3 The voter had a choice of voting for a candidate he
did not support, or not voting at all. Rejecting his claim, the Court's

opinion stressed that the burden the state's overall ballot access system imposed on voters' choices, not the write-in ban itself, determined whether the ban violated the right to vote.2 5 4 If the state's
ballot access system was acceptable, the write-in ban imposed only a
Id. at 438.
See Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 330, 363-78 (1993)
(explaining the expressive nature of the vote).
251 Rational choice theorists have described the act of voting as having very small instrumental benefits. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 244 (1957).
252 The Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze explained:
[Ballot access] restrictions threaten to reduce diversity and competition in
the marketplace of ideas. Historically political figures outside the two major parties have been fertile sources of new ideas and new programs; many
of their challenges to the status quo have in time made their way into the
political mainstream.
460 U.S. 780, 794 (1983); see also Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878
F.2d 776, 782 (4th Cir. 1989) ("It is apodictic that a vote does not lose its constitutional
significance merely because it is cast for a candidate who has little or no chance of winning
....[T]he right to vote for the candidate of one's choice includes the right to say that no
candidate is acceptable.").
253 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 442 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
254 As long as the "State's ballot access laws pass constitutional muster.., a prohibition
on write-in voting will be presumptively valid .... " Id. at 441. The Court analyzed the
Hawaii ballot access system under the ballot access case law and found it constitutionally
adequate because of its low signature requirement for obtaining a place on the primary
ballot. See id. at 439.
249
250
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"limited burden" on voters.2 55 The question of whether the system
presented that particular individual voter with adequate electoral
choice did not enter into this analysis. 256 In sum, the right to vote
only protects an individual's right to choose among "already nominated, bona fide candidates" 25 7 and to participate in a state-structured
electoral process. 2 58 As a result, it is questionable whether the light to
vote retains much meaningful significance as a limitation on state
power to regulate minor parties outside of traditional ballot access
cases. 259 The Supreme Court's treatment of voter choice increases
the disparity in the legal status of major and minor party candidates by
making it difficult for minor parties to argue that an electoral system
which presents voters with inadequate choices warrants court intervention. This factor had previously benefitted minor parties and in260
dependent candidates.
2.

Minor Parties and State Mandated Party Nomination Procedures

Like the major parties, the minor parties have attempted to use
the courts to increase their autonomy from the state and reduce state
intervention into the parties' internal affairs. Unlike their treatment
of major parties, states appear to retain considerable discretion to regulate party nomination procedures, regardless of the effect that the
nominating procedures have on the political activities of minor parties. In Lightfoot v. Eu,26 ' the Libertarian Party unsuccessfully challenged a California statute requiring political parties to nominate
candidates solely by a state-mandated direct primary.2 62 The Republi255 See id. at 438-40.
256 In dissentJustice Kennedy,joined byJustices Blackmun and Stevens, characterized
the burden as one on the voter's right to cast a meaningful ballot. See id. at 445. The
dominance of the Democratic Party in the state resulted in many unopposed elections.
Because only one candidate appeared on the ballot for the race in question, the voter's
choice consisted of voting only for the single candidate on the ballot or not voting at all.
The write-in ban deprived the voters of their right to vote for their favored candidateregardless of whether that candidate was a longshot-and therefore their vote was not
meaningful. See id. at 442.
257 Karlan, supranote 77, at 1712.
258 See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
259 Cf Sean R. Sullivan, Note, A Term Limit by Any Other Name?: The Constitutionalityof
State-Enacted Ballot Access Restrictions on Incumbent Members of Congress, 56 U. Prrr. L. REv.
845, 872 n.166 (1995) (suggesting that Burdick collapsed the right to vote analysis into the

associational rights inquiry).
260 See Cripps v. Seneca County Bd.of Elections, 629 F. Supp. 1335, 1346-47 (N.D.
Ohio 1985) (early filing deadline restricted access to alternative political viewpoints); Libertarian Party v. Beermann, 598 F. Supp. 57, 64 (D. Neb. 1984) (signature requirement
heavily burdened right to vote by restricting the elector's choice); McCarthy v. Noel, 420 F.
Supp. 799, 803-04 (D.R.I. 1976) (invalidating statute that required independent candidates
to complete procedural formalities before major party candidates).
261
262

964 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 869-71.
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can Party brought a similar challenge in Faulkner-claiming that a
state-structured primary interfered with the party's ability to select its
candidates. In order to gain greater influence over the nomination
process, the Libertarian Party enacted a party rule that allowed the
party to nominate a candidate for the general election at a post-primary convention if no candidate ran for a particular office in the
state-mandated primary. 2 63 When the party nominated candidates at
the convention, the Secretary of State refused to place the libertarian
candidates on the general election ballot despite the fact that the Libertarians had already satisfied California's onerous ballot access
requirements.264
The Party claimed that mandating a direct primary be the sole
method for selecting candidates was an attempt to regulate the internal affairs of the Party, and thus burdened the Party's associational
rights.2 65 Rejecting this claim, the Ninth Circuit noted that "the
[Supreme] Court has recognized that rules governing political parties' internal affairs impose a significant burden on those parties...
[but] has suggested that the states' power to regulate the nominating
process is beyond dispute. '2 66 The court relied on American Party v.
White,2 67 in which the Supreme Court noted that a state may require
either a primary or a convention but did not in fact decide whether a
party must only nominate candidates in a primary.2 68 To buttress the
weak precedent, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because party reformers created the direct primary to cripple the power of "party
bosses," the state's interest in enhancing "the democratic character of
the election process overrides whatever interest the Party has in designing its own rules for nominating candidates.1 269 This argument is
not strong. It is far more democratic to allow a party that has met the
263 See id. at 867 (discussing California Elections Code § 6653). The Party also challenged California Elections Code § 6661(a), which requires the candidate to receive a
number of votes in the primary equal to "'1 percent of all votes cast for the office at the last
preceding general election at which the office was filled.'" Id. at 866 (quoting CAL.ELEc.

CODE § 6661 (a) (West Supp. 1992)). Because this statute is a classic ballot access provision,
it is beyond the scope of this discussion.
264 See id.
at 866-67.
265 See id. at 872.
266 Id. at 872.
267 415 U.S. 767 (1974)
268 See id. at 781 ("It is too plain for argument... that the State may limit each political party to one candidate for each office on the ballot and.may insist that intraparty
competition be settled before the general election by pimary election or by party convention.")
(emphasis added). The Lightfoot court recognized that no federal court had actually decided the question. Lightfoot, 964 F.2d at 872. Such strong reliance on American Party
seems misplaced. The case was decided in 1974, long before the significant expansion of
political parties' association rights in the mid-1980s. In addition, the court cited Scalia's
dissent in Tashjian-not exactly compelling legal precedent. See id. (quoting Tashjian v.
Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 235 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
269 Lightfoot, 964 F.2d at 873.
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state's ballot qualification requirements to select a candidate at a party
convention than to deny the voters an opportunity to vote for any
candidate at all. After all, because the party could not fill the vacancy
in the election, the party's ballot line would simply be empty.
2 70
The Ninth Circuit, despite explicitly applying strict scrutiny,
did not consider how the direct primary requirement interfered with
the party's associational rights. Instead, the Ninth Circuit relied exclusively on the state's assertedjustification: "to take political nominations out of the smoke-filled rooms of party bosses and give them to
the voters."2 71 In other words, the state sought to protect the party
from the influence of its own leadership. This is precisely the type of
paternalistic rationale the Supreme Court has rejected in the past. In
Tashjian, for example, the state of Connecticut argued that Independent voters should not be allowed to vote in the Republican Primary
because it would undermine the effectiveness of the party.2 7 2 The
Court described such a state interest as "insubstantial,"2 73 noting that
"'a State... may not constitutionally substitute its own judgment for
that of the Party.'" 274 Similarly, in Eu, the Court found that California
could not justify its ban on party endorsements in primaries on the
ground that the ban protected the party from "pursuing self destructive acts." 2 75 The Court has drawn a clear distinction: "a State may
enact laws to 'prevent the disruption of the political parties from without' but not.., laws 'to prevent the parties from taking internal steps
276
affecting the own process for the selection of candidates.'
Although there may be other arguments against the use of party conventions, it seems doubtful whether the state's interest in protecting
the party from itself is sufficient to uphold the law under strict
scrutiny.
Perhaps the party could have shown, as the Republican Party did
in Faulkner,that a direct primary allowed voters from other parties to
participate in its primary and increased the probability that a candi2 77
date whose views conflicted with the party could win the election.
Furthermore, as Professor Lowenstein has recognized:
[T]he conventional constitutional analysis that led the Court to
strike down the requirement for a closed primary in Tashjian and
270

See id. at 868-69

271

Id. at 872.

272
273
274
12-24
275

276

Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 222-24.
See id. at 225.
Id. at 224 (quoting Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex re.La Follette, 450 U.S. 107,
(1981)).
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 227 (1989).

Id. (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 224).
Cf.Republican Party v. Faulkner County, 49 F.d 1289, 1301 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Arkansas has likely increased, not decreased, the risk that a... fraudulent candidate could
win that party's nomination.").
277
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the statutory governance procedures in Eu could be extended with
may not require an unequal logic to the conclusion that the state
2 78

willing party to conduct a primary at all.

In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized the right of parties to elect candidates that best represent their ideology.2 79 The regulation of nominating procedures implicates this right.2 80 At the very

least, the associational rights at stake were more complex than they
appeared to the Ninth Circuit. Notably, the Ninth Circuit did not
complete the analysis required by Anderson and its progeny. To survive strict scrutiny, the Court has required the statute be the least restrictive means of advancing the asserted state interest.2 8 ' As the
Supreme Court noted in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central
Committee,28 2 "a State cannotjustify regulating a party's internal affairs
without showing that such regulation is necessary to ensure an election that is orderly and fair."28 3 The Court did not explain why a statute that only allowed parties to select candidates in a direct primary
was the least restrictive means necessary to ensure a fair election.
The Libertarian Party wanted the autonomy to select, through its
own internal and democratic processes, which candidates would appear on their party-line in the general election. In Duke v. Cleland, the
Eleventh Circuit granted analogous powers to the Republican Party by
enabling a candidate committee to completely control which candidates appeared on the primary ballot, 28 4 and in Faulknerthe Eighth

Circuit limited the power of the state to dictate nominating procedures that interfered with party associational rights.2 8 5 Lightfoot stands
in considerable tension with these cases. Perhaps the disparity in
treatment is due to the fact that a minor party brought the claim and
this status somehow strengthened the state's interest in regulating the
party. But the type of burden on the party-the ability to select their
candidates-was the same in the three cases. Nonetheless, the case
supports the proposition that major and minor parties are not ac278

Lowenstein, supra note 43, at 1768. Professor Lowenstein strongly qualified this

observation by noting that the Supreme Court is very unlikely to extend associational rights
this far because this application of the constitutional principle would be outside its proper
range. Id. at 1768 n.102.
279 See Eu, 489 U.S. at 229.
280 See id. at 230.
281 See, e.g., Illinois Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185 (1979)
(noting that "signature requirements for independent candidates and political parties
seeking offices in Chicago are plainly not the least restrictive means of protecting the
state's objectives"); see alsoNorman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 294 (1992) (noting that the state
did not choose the "most narrowly tailored means" of advancing its interest); McLaughlin
v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.Sd 1215, 1221 (4th Cir. 1995) (same).
282 489 U.S. 228 (1989).
283
Id. at 233.
284 See supraPart I.D.1.
285
See supraPart I.D.2.
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corded the same protection from state intrusions into their internal
affairs.
3.

State Manipulation of Party Identification and Voter Registration

A number of states assist the major parties' organizational efforts
by funding and administering voter registration drives that register
voters according to party affiliation. 286 States utilize voter enrollment
lists to administer primary elections and generally regulate the political process. 287 When an individual registers to vote, the state provides the voter with the opportunity to indicate a party affiliation. 28 8
The state then compiles these voter registration lists and undertakes
the time-consuming task of identifying individuals who are sympathetic to a party's ideology. 28 9 Although states have legitimate interests in requiring voter registration, once the state decides to compile
290
the list and to provide the list free-of-charge to the major parties,
the state moves from being a regulator of the political process to a
facilitator of party growth. A number of states, however, refuse to allow individuals to designate an affiliation with a party that has not
achieved a certain level of statewide recognition. 29' In these circumstances, the legislators provide party-building services at state expense
for the major parties, but deny these services to minor parties. In the
last decade, minor parties have brought a number of associational
rights challenges to these laws, but have had relatively little success.
The initial foray into this area of law looked hopeful for minor
parties. In Baer v. Meyer,292 the Tenth Circuit invalidated a law that
prohibited voters from affiliating with the Libertarian Party unless the
party had achieved statewide recognition. 293 The court held that the
statute was invalid under Anderson because it imposed an "unequal
and unnecessary burden" on the unrecognized party's associational
29 4
rights and deprived the minor party of access to vital information.
286

STEPHEN

E. FRA-IzICH, PoLrricAL

PARnES IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE

139-41

(1989).
287 See, e.g., NEw YoRK ELsc. LAW § 5-604 (McKinney 1995). Currently, voter registration and party enrollment are required by about half the states and are often used as partybuilding tools. See FRANrrzicH, supra note 286, at 139-40; REICHLEY, supra note 6, at 424.
288
See FANrzICH, supra note 286, at 140.
289 See id. at 66-68 (noting that the Republican Party, for example, has compiled a list
of 1.7 million individuals from whom they solicit funds).
290 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. North Carolina Board of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215 (4th Cir.
1995).
291 See, e.g., IowA CODE § 48.6 (1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 1-110, 4-112 (1989).
292 728 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
293 The party needed to win ten percent of the vote in the last election for governor.
See id. at 472.
294
The court reasoned that access to information about political party affiliation is
vital to effective organization and campaigning. By forcing party adherents to register as
"unaffiliated," the parties were unable to use the system for this purpose. See id. at 475.
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Because the state registration system was computerized, allowing voters to register with their party by noting their party affiliation with a
single letter on the state's enrollment form constituted a "nominal
effort" by the state. 295 Although the state raised the specter of attempting to sort out frivolous affiliations, the court held that the states
must permit party designation only if "a political organization already
exists in the State, has recognized officials, and has previously placed a
29 6
candidate on the ballot by petition."
Since the Libertarians' early success in Colorado, courts have
consistently retreated from the Baer decision. First, the Tenth Circuit
largely reversed itself when the Libertarian and Populist Parties
sought to invalidate a similar law in Rainbow Coalitionv. Oklahoma State
Election Board.2 97 The court distinguished the Oklahoma system from
the Colorado system on the grounds that Oklahoma's voter registration system was not computerized. Thus, the increased administrative
burdens caused by adding parties tipped the balance of interests in
favor of the state.2 98 Similarly, in Iowa Socialist Party v. Nelson,2 99 the
Sixth Circuit followed Rainbow Coalitionto uphold a similar statute in
Iowa. Iowa required the signatures of two percent of the vote to be
recognized. Because the Oklahoma statute in Rainbow allowed registration for political parties that collected the signatures of five percent
of the state's voters but the Colorado statute in Baer required ten percent of the vote, the court reasoned that the Iowa statute was more
similar to Oklahoma's and therefore Rainbow Coalition controlled.3 0 0
Later, in McLaughlin v. North Carolina Board of Elections,30 ' the
Fourth Circuit approved an even more unequal voter registration system. Under North Carolina's system, if a political party gathers signatures equal to two percent of the votes cast in the most recent general
election, the party gains access to the North Carolina ballot and can
register voters, but the party must obtain ten percent of the vote in the
next election to maintain this status.3 02 If the minor party fails to receive the requisite ten percent of the vote, it legally ceases to exist and
the state changes all the party member registrations to "unaffiliated."
To gain ballot access for the next election, the party must again submit the required signatures to become certified and then "reaffiliate"
295
296
297
298
299

See id.
Id.

844 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1988).
See id. at 747.
909 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1990).
300 See id. at 1180. The court failed to note, however, that Rainbow relied on the lack of
a computerized state voter registration system in Oklahoma, which imposed additional administrative burdens on the state, and did not distinguish the statutes on the basis of their
party-recognition requirements. See Rainbow Coalition, 844 F.2d at 747.
301

65 F.3d 1215 (4th Cir. 1995).

302

See id. at 1218-19.
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the voters the state eliminated from the voter lists.- 03 In contrast, the
state requires each county board of elections to provide both the state
and individual Democrat and Republican county chairmen (100 in
all) "the name, address, gender, date of birth, race, political affilia30 4
tion, voting history, and precinct of each registered voter" for free.
The court found that forcing the party to reregister its members
for each election did not constitute a significant burden under Anderson.30 5 The court reasoned that because the minor party could
purchase the list for a fee before the affiliations were stricken, the
party's claim that it could not benefit from the state's voter registration efforts was "without merit."3 0 6 The Fourth Circuit analyzed the
burdens imposed by the statute without considering the state's interest in providing lists for free to major parties but not to minor parties. 30 7 The statute served the state's interest in administrative
simplicity, however, because if all political parties have a right to affiliate voters, such a list could possibly become "sizable" and "cause confusion" for registrars trying to keep track of parties with similar
names. 30 8 This contingent interest was deemed sufficient to outweigh
the burden imposed on the party. 30 9
303 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-97 (1994). The party may obtain the lists before the voter
registration names are erased, but they must pay a fee. McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1228.
304

N.C. GEN.

STAT. §

163-97(c) (1994).

305 Compare Baer v. Meyer, 728 F.2d 471, 475 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The difficulty is that
under current practice... [the voter registration scheme has] prevented persons other
than those affiliated with the two major political parties from obtaining and using such
information in a manner similar to that of the major parties.") with McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at
1228 (characterizing the burden imposed by requiring the parties to reaffliliate voters as
cognizable, but small).
306 McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1228.
307 See id. The Fourth Circuit's failure to consider this issue created a conflict with the
Second Circuit. In Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 60 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit
invalidated a statute that required local election boards to provide copies of voter registration lists to ballot-qualified parties, but not to "independent bodies" (which includes minor
parties that are not ballot qualified) on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause. See id. at 60. Striking the law, the Second Circuit approvingly quoted the original
district court opinion: "The State has shown no compelling state interest nor even ajustifiable purpose for granting-what, in effect, is a significant subsidy only to those parties which
have least need therefore .... " Id. (citing Socialist Workers Party v. Rockefeller, 314 F.
Supp. 984, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affid mem., 400 U.S. 806 (1970)).
308 McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1228 (quoting McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 850 F. Supp. 373, 386 (M.D.N.C. 1994)).
309 A closer examination of the administrative burden justification reveals that it is a
weak one. Under the current scheme, the Libertarian Party, for example, has achieved
ballot status in North Carolina in most of the recent elections (1976, 1980, 1984, and
1992). See id. at 1219-20. After each election, however, the statute requires the state to
identify and remove all the party's affiliated voters from lists containing over three million
voters. See MicHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMEIcAN PoLrics 1992,

at 916 (1992) (noting that in 1990 North Carolina had 3,347,635 registered voters). In the
next election cycle, the party submits the signatures and reaffiliates its old members, requiring the state to switch the voter's affiliations back to Libertarian, and in each election
cycle this process repeats. See id. Thus, a serious third-party that consistently qualifies for
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Under Anderson/Burdick, even if the burden is not severe, the distinction between major and minor parties must nonetheless be reasonable and non-discriminatory. 31 0 When the state has actively
immersed itself in the party-building process, perhaps there should be
some interest in addition to mere administrative convenience to justify the disparate treatment.3 1 ' These cases demonstrate that associational rights of minor parties do not significantly limit the ability of
states to treat minor and major parties unequally.
4. Minor Parties and Equal Treatment in Ballot Formulation
The voting franchise is exercised through a ballot created by state
election officials. If a state can create a ballot that makes it difficult to
find minor party candidates who have qualified for the ballot, the
state distorts the outcome of the election by confusing voters. Minor
parties can invoke the right to a meaningful or effective vote to challenge state-created distinctions based on minor party status after the
candidate has qualified for the ballot. However, that doctrine only
protects the interests of minor parties when the state clearly behaves
unreasonably.
The clearest example of bias against minor parties in ballot formulation, the states' allocation of ballot location based on a parties'
past electoral success, is relatively well established.3 1 2 This practice enthe ballot imposes a considerable burden on the voter registration system. By comparison,
the state could simply maintain the lists, and allow voter registration until the deadline for
filing ballot access signatures for the next election. If the party failed to achieve ballot
status, then the voter affiliations could be changed. Such an arrangement avoids the administrative difficulties created when parties consistently qualify for the ballot. In addition,
the state's concern over a multiplicity of small parties is misplaced because only parties
large enough to obtain the required signatures (51,904) are eligible for voter registration.
See id. at 1223. Therefore, the correct conclusion is that the state's scheme greatly increases, rather than decreases, administrative complexity, and does notjustify the burdens
imposed by the system.
To illustrate the inequality of the burdens at stake, it is useful to consider the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Rosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992), in which the state of
Ohio refused to allow an independent candidate to place a designation on the ballot indicating his nonaffiliated status. State law, however, allowed the major parties to designate
party affiliation on the ballot. The Sixth Circuit held that, when a state manipulates identification of party affiliation on a ballot to the advantage of the major parties, associational
and voting rights are burdened. See id at 169. A voter registration form, like an election
ballot, is a "[s] tate-devised form through which candidates and voters are required to express themselves" at a crucial moment of choice in the electoral process. Id. at 175.
Although a state clearly may decide to leave party enrollment procedures to the parties
themselves, once a state decides to "manipulate the content" of the voter registration
forms, like the ballot itself, it must treat the parties equally.
310 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
311
Cf. Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 218 (1986) (holding that a state
cannot restrain party's "freedom of association for reasons of its own administrative
convenience").
312 For example, courts have found ballot formulation schemes constitutional that automatically place independent candidates and minor parties in a worse ballot position than
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sures that the major parties are the first two parties listed on the ballot, which makes it slightly less likely that voters will find the minor
party line.3 13 All is not lost for minor parties, however. In Rosen v.
Brown,3 14 the Sixth Circuit held that an Ohio statute that prohibited a
candidate from designating his "Independent" status after his name
on the ballot, but allowed the major party designations to appear, infringed the rights of voters to meaningfully vote and associate.3 1 5 The
candidate produced expert testimony showing that the law resulted
from the domination of the ballot access system by the major parties
and that voters' use of party designation as a "voting cue" was the
"most significant determinant of voting behavior."3 16 Without this label, voters did not know what the candidate represented, and the label's absence created "mistrust and negative inferences" regarding the
317
candidate at the crucial moment when voters made their choice.
Characterizing the law as "nothing more than a deliberate attempt by the State to protect and guarantee the success of the Democratic and Republican parties,"3 18 the court held that "[o]nce a State
admits a particular subject to the ballot," the state must respect the
constitutional rights of other political actors.3 19 A law that provides a
voting cue for Democrats and Republicans, but denies the same cue to
other candidates, severely damages those other candidates' electoral
chances.32 0 Although the state asserted an interest in minimizing
voter confusion and protecting the integrity of political parties, this
latter interest "may not extend to the effective exclusion of Independent and new party candidates."3 2' In fact, voter confusion arguably
the major parties, see Libertarian Party v. Buckley, 937 F. Supp. 687 (D. Colo. 1996); Krasnoffv. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. La. 1977), or utilize the performance of the parties in
the last election to determine ballot placement, Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.
1978). Only two states, Delaware and Oklahoma, mandate that the Democrats and Republicans appear first on the ballot, but all states except four (Alabama, Idaho, Mississippi,
Virginia) ensure this order results either by using party strength to determine the order or
by allowing a state election official to determine the order. SeeKatz & Kolodny, supra note
2, at 30. It is possible that states cannot mandate that one party always appear first however, see Graves v. McEldery, 946 F. Supp. 1569, 1581-82 (W.D. Okla. 1996), or provide such
an advantage to the incumbent, see McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159, 1167 (8th Cir. 1980).
313 "Research has shown that placement at the top of a ballot often confers an advantage to candidates so positioned." Morse v. Republican Party, 116 S. Ct. 1186, 1195 n.13
(1996); see also Buckley, 937 F. Supp. at 692.
314 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992).
315 Associational rights are implicated as well by interfering with the desired association for political gain. See id. at 176. However, the injury suffered is more clearly conceptualized as an impediment to the act of casting a ballot for a desired and qualified candidate.
316 Id. at 172.
317
Id. at 172-73.
318
Id. at 176.
319
Id. at 175.
320

See id. at 175.

321

Id. at 177.
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increased because the statute withheld relevant information regarding
the candidates' lack of affiliation.
The Rosen court distinguished the Fifth Circuit holding in Dart v.
Brown,322 which permitted the state to print the party affiliation of
"recognized parties" on the ballot, but left the notation blank for ballot-qualified candidates affiliated with "unrecognized" political parties. 28 If an unrecognized 24 political party candidate gained ballot
placement by petition, the state refused to allow the candidate's
3 25
designation to appear on the ballot.
Although the statute involved was analogous to Rosen,326 the court
in Dart determined that the Libertarian Party candidate who qualified
for ballot, but was denied a party designation, suffered only a "minor,
indirect and remote" burden because the party's supporters had a
"full opportunity" to vote for their chosen candidate. 327 The law was
simply a permissible distinction based on the success of political parties in prior elections.
The Dart court, however, made an important qualification of its
holding. If the absence of party affiliation diminished a candidate's
chances of electoral success, then the statute "might arguably ...impair the ability to cast a meaningful vote." 28 The plaintiff in Dart had
failed to produce any evidence demonstrating this effect, 3 29 while the
plaintiff in Rosen had submitted studies and expert testimony that
demonstrated the negative impact of the statute.3 30 Therefore, the
Dartdecision is best understood as a failure of evidence. As a result, a
state cannot formulate a ballot that interferes with the ability of .minor
party supporters to cast their ballots for the ballot-qualified party of
their choice. 33 1 However, the minor party will have to provide a con322

717 F.2d 1491 (5th Cir. 1983).

323

See id. at 1493-94.
The Louisiana state election code recognized a political party if the party's presi-

324

dential candidate received five percent of the vote in the previous presidential election or
if five percent of the registered voters in the state were affiliated with the party. Individual
candidates could qualify for the ballot even if their party did not. See id. at 1495.
325

See id. at 1498.

CompareRosen v. Brown, 970 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1992) (statute prohibited qualified
independent candidates from placing designation on ballot), with Dart 717 F.2d at 1495
(statute prohibiting minor party candidates from unqualified parties who qualify individually by petition from placing party affiliation on the ballot).
326

327

Dart, 717 F.2d at 1504.

Id. at 1504-05.
See id. at 1505.
330 See Rosen, 973 F.2d at 172-73.
331 See Devine v. Rhode Island, 827 F. Supp. 852, 862 (D.R.I. 1993) (state cannot construct ballot that creates the confusing visual appearance that implies an association between a candidate and a party with which he is not affiliated); New Alliance Party v. North
Carolina State Bd.of Elections, 697 F. Supp. 904 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (states cannot prohibit
placement of minor parties' local candidates on ballot while allowing state and national
candidates to appear); Bachrach v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 415 N.E.2d 832 (Mass.
328
329
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siderable quantum of evidence that the ballot actually interfered with
33 2
voters ability to vote for the candidates.
In short, the formulation of the state ballot can infringe upon the
rights of minor political parties. States cannot unreasonably withhold
information or actively confuse voters. However, because the states
are free to use past performance to determine ballot placement, these
limitations on state discretion are not overly significant. In addition,
ballot formulation, while it might have some effect, is not central to
the minor parties' efforts to maintain and expand their political activities. The ballot access laws, by comparison, present a far more urgent
threat. Thus, this legal protection is not politically significant.
5.

Fusion Statutes and the AssociationalRights of Minor Parties: A
Split in the Circuits

The expansion of associational rights has created one issue of potentially serious importance for minor parties: the constitutionality of
fusion laws. Anti-fusion statutes are state laws that forbid candidates
from receiving the nomination of more than one political party in the
same election. 33 3 Minor parties employ fusion as an electoral strategy
to support major party candidates with whom they agree on policy
issues. In New York, for example, the Liberal, Conservative, and
Right-to-Life parties utilize strategic nominations effectively to advance their interests and survive as minor parties. 334 In 1993, the
number of votes Rudolph Giuliani, the Republican candidate for New
York City Mayor, received on the Liberal Party line provided him the
margin of victory in the election. 3 35 Fusion thus enables the minor
parties in New York to influence elections and the resulting exposure
1981) (statute requiring independent candidates to be designated as unenrolled violated
the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause). But see Socialist Workers Party v.
Eu, 591 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding state statute requiring independent designation for all candidates qualifying by petition).
332 The evidentiary showing required to invalidate an unfair ballot formulation is unclear, but it is clearly substantial. States still retain considerable discretion to determine
how to structure the contents of ballots. In Devine, 827 F. Supp. at 854, the state violated
the constitutional rights of a minor political party by placing its candidates, albeit with
their own party designations, in a column labeled with bold type "Independents for
LaRouche." Without requiring any specific evidence, the court declared that "the inescapable visual effect was a direct association between the plaintiff... and 'INDEPENDENTS FOR LaROUCHE.'" Id. at 856. Such blatant discrimination is the exception,
however. Generally, minor parties must produce specific evidence illustrating that the ballot actually interfered with the ability of voters to cast a vote by misleading them. See New
Alliance Party v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 861 F. Supp. 287, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
333
For the history of fusion statutes and the associational right arguments for declaring statutes forbidding fusion unconstitutional, see Kirschner, Note, supra note 17, at 683;
see also Note, Fusion Candidacies,Disaggregation,and Freedom ofAssociation, 109 HAuv. L. REv.
1302 (1996) (presenting arguments based on the ballot access caselaw).
334 See Kirschner, supra note 17, at 684.
335 See id. at 683.
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helps them to develop party organizations.33 6 The Circuits are split
on the constitutionality of fusion laws.3 5 7 Central to the disparity in

the courts' decisions is their characterization of how anti-fusion laws
burden minor party associational rights.
In Swamp v. Kennedy,338 the state of Wisconsin relied on an antifusion statute to prohibit the Labor-Farm Party from attempting to
place the Democratic candidate for Secretary of State, Douglass La
Follette, on the party's primary ballot. The party claimed the prohibition burdened their associational rights in two ways: (1) under Eu, the
ban infringed the party's autonomy by restricting its ability to select
candidates; and (2) the prohibition had a "disproportionate impact
on the electoral success of third parties."38 9 Two members of a threemember panel of the Seventh Circuit rejected the minor party's
claims. The majority concluded that the party's autonomy was not
burdened because the party was only "prevented from placing on
their primary ballot the name of a candidate who has previously been
[nominated] ," otherwise the "party may nominate any candidate that
the party can convince to be its candidate."3 40 In addition, the impact
on minor parties was justified because "allowing minority parties to
leech onto larger parties for support decreases real competition; forcing parties to [choose] their own candidates promotes competition."341 That court further argued that the state's compelling
interest in "avoiding voter confusion," "preserving the integrity of its
election process," and "limit[ing] involuntary fusion of political par3 42
ties" justified the restriction.
Although the plaintiff's petition for a rehearing en banc was deniedJudge Ripple,joined byJudges Easterbrook and Posner, voted to
grant the rehearing and sharply criticized the panel's decision.343
Judge Ripple characterized the ban as a "broad and severe regulation"
that implicated the "right of a party to nominate a candidate of its
336
Currently, about ten states permit the practice, while it is prohibited in the remainder of the states and the District of Columbia. See id.
at 685 nn.1-14.
337 See Patriot Party v. Allegheny County Dep't of Elections, 95 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1996)
(invalidating and-fusion statute); Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196 (8th
Cir.) (same), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1846 (1996). But see Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383
(7th Cir. 1991) (upholding anti-fusion statute).
338 950 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1992).

340

Id. at 385.
Id. (emphasis omitted).

341

Id.

339

342 Id. at 386. Judge Fairchild interpreted the third state interest
taining a stable political system." Id. at 387. A strong argument can
actually works, in practice, against all the state's asserted interests.
supra note 17, at 703-17.
343
Swamp, 950 F.2d at 388-89 (Ripple, J., dissenting from denial

to be akin to "mainbe made that fusion
See Kirschner, Note,
of rehearing).
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choice," and argued that fusion "sends an important message to the
3
candidate." 44
In Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna,345 a local minor party
nominated Andy Dawkins, a state representative from the DemocraticFarm-Labor Party (DFL),34 as its candidate for state representative.
Although, the New Party gathered the required number of signatures
to place Dawkins on the ballot, the Secretary of State rejected the
nominating petitions because they violated a combination of statutes
that had the practical effect of eliminating multi-party nomination.3 47
The Eighth Circuit invoked the core associational rights of parties:
the right "to select a standard bearer who best represents the party"
and to select their own candidate 48 The denial of a party's opportunity to select the candidate of its choice constituted a severe burden
under Anderson3 49 because historical evidence illustrated that "minor
political parties have played a significant role in the electoral system
where multiple party nomination is legal, but have no meaningful influence where multiple party nomination is banned."3 5 0 In addition,
fusion laws interfered with the ability of minor parties to develop consensual political alliances, thus weakening support for party activities. 35 1 The court did not determine whether the state's interests were
compelling, but rather analyzed whether the law was narrowly tailored. Minnesota's asserted interest in preventing factionalism in the
major parties was rejected, however, because the state remained free
to require the major party to consent to the minor party nomination.3 5 2 In addition, contrary to the state's claims, voter confusion
caused by a name appearing on more than one line seemed especially
unlikely because the minor party nominations would actually inform
the voters of the candidates' policy stands,353 and ballot instructions
could clarify any confusion that the multiple appearance might
344
345

Id. at 388-89.
73 F.3d 196 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1846, stay denied, 116 S. Ct. 2542

(1996).
346 The Democratic-Farm-Labor Party (DFL) is the name of the Minnesota state Democratic Party. It is one of two major parties in the state. See BARONE & UJIFUSA, supra note
309, at 653.
347 The statutes required candidates to provide an affidavit stating that the candidate
had no other affidavit on file for the next election, and prohibited a candidate nominated
by primary also to be nominated by petition. See Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 197.
348 Id. at 198 (internal quotation omitted).
349 Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 792-95 (1983).
350
Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 199.
351 See id.
352 See id.
353
See id. at 199-200. The Supreme Court has noted that a state's claim that it is minimizing voter confusion by restricting the flow of information "must be viewed with some
skepticism." Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228
(1989).
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cause. 3 i As a result, the law was not narrowly tailored. Finally, in
PatriotParty v. Allegheny County Departmentof Elections,355 the Third Circuit invalidated a statutory scheme that allowed the Democrats and
Republicans to cross-nominate candidates, but did not allow minor
political parties to cross-nominate.3 56 Again, the court relied on the
party's core associational rights-to choose their own candidates and
3 57
form political alliances-to strike down the law.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Twin Cities.35 8 The
Court's decision may clarify the limits of the associational rights doctrine. Under the associational rights doctrine, the case for fusion is
strong because historical evidence demonstrates that fusion enables
minor parties to become effective political organizations.3 5 9 If the actual effect of a state law on minor parties' political activities is considered under the Anderson balancing test,3 60 and minor parties cannot
survive without fusion, it is difficult to understand what state law could
be more "burdensome." At the same time, a prime justification for
fusion arguably runs counter to the Court's right-to-vote doctrine as
expressed in Burdick. The Third and Eighth Circuits both argued that
votes cast for major party candidates on minor party ballot lines send
candidates an important message-that they support the minor
party's political views. 3 6' Yet the Burdick Court rejected the claim that
voting is for expressing opinions.3 62 Thus, the court will most likely
See Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 199.
95 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 1996).
See id. at 270. Allegheny County was, in one way, an easier case because the state
facially discriminated against minor parties. In the court's analysis, this disparity in treatment increased the burden under Anderson, see id. at 262, and led the court to analyze the
statute under the Equal Protection Clause, see id. at 268-70. Although the equal protection
argument was similar to the First Amendment balancing analysis, the court focused on
whether the law imposed "unequal burdens" without a "countervailing state interest." Id.
at 270.
357
See id. at 262.
358
116 S. Ct. 1846 (1996).
359
See Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 199; see also Kirschner, Note, supra note 17, at 701-03.
360
The Supreme Court has noted that historical evidence of the impact of electoral
regulations is relevant to the constitutional argument. However, the Court has, at times,
given this evidence minimal weight in the analysis. Compare Munro v. Socialist Workers
Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1986) (noting that although historical facts are relevant, the
fact that a blanket primary system excluded almost every minor party candidate proved
"very little" in that case), with id. at 200 (Marshall,J, dissenting) ("[T]he Court holds today
that the associational rights of minor parties... are not unduly burdened by a ballot access
statute that, in practice, completely excludes minor parties from participating in statewide
general elections.").
361
See Allegheny County, 95 F.3d at 261; Twin Cities, 73 F.3d at 199; see also Swamp, 950
F.2d at 389 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (noting that fusion may yield valuable information for
the electorate).
362
The Court stated:
[T]he function of the election process is "to winnow out and finally reject
all but the chosen candidates," not to provide a means of giving vent to
"short-range political goals, pique, or personal quarrel[s]." Attributing to
354
855
356
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be forced to articulate how fusion does or does not affect minor parties' associational rights, without relying on the expressive benefits of
fusion. If fusion is constitutionally required, it is ironic that one of the
main beneficiaries will be major party candidates, who can now seek
votes they otherwise might not have gotten by pursuing minor party
nominations.
6.

Summary

Overall, the expansion of associational rights for political parties
following Anderson has not been very helpful for minor parties. The
associational rights cases have neither lessened state control over minor parties' nomination process, nor lessened the disparate treatment
that minor parties receive in the voter registration process. Similarly,
states retain the discretion to formulate ballots in ways that discriminate against minor parties, except when that ballot formulation
clearly interferes with voting rights. Moreover, the Burdick Court's recent treatment of the right to vote signals an erosion of the Court's
willingness to protect the voting interests of minor party supporters.
Nevertheless, if the expansion of associational rights results in the invalidation of state anti-fusion laws, minor parties will have won a significant victory.
II
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE BALLOT ACCESS RESTRICTIONS

A.

Ballot Access: The End of Court Ordered Ballot Access
Deregulation

Minor political parties want to put candidates on the ballot. It is
the paradigmatic case of power politics when the two major parties
craft pure ballot access laws that create unduly restrictive requirements for third parties.3 63 Signature requirements and loyalty oaths,
for example, appeared after the early successes of the Socialist Party in
the 1930s, and again following Harry Wallace and the Progressive
elections a more generalized expressive function would undermine the
ability of States to operate elections fairly and efficiently.
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992) (citations omitted); see also Note, supra note
833, at 1319-21 (arguing that due to Burdick, "[a] constitutional right to fusion must be
grounded elsewhere than in the claim that [voting] sends a political message"); David

Perney, Note, The Dimensions of the Right to Vote: The Write-In Vote, Donald Duck, and Voting
Booth Speech Written-Off,58 Mo. L. REv. 945, 965 (1993) (arguing that after Burdick, "The act
of voting is only to determine an office holder, not to contribute to the marketplace of
ideas.").
363 See Katz & Kolodny, supranote 2, at 30 ("[T] he states have attempted to institutionalize not just a two party system, but a system dominated precisely by the Democratic and
Republican Parties.").
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Party in 1948.364 In 1930, signature requirements were actually quite
low; only four states required new parties to gather more than 10,000
3 65
signatures to gain access to the ballot for the United States Senate.
After this period, however, states began drastically increasing the bal3 66
lot access requirements.
Pure ballot access cases involve procedures a candidate must follow to qualify for the ballot without receiving a major party nomination.3 67 A majority of the Supreme Court has never recognized
candidacy as a fundamental right, and, thus, it is insufficient to invoke "strict scrutiny" of ballot access restrictions. 368 The Anderson
Court established that courts decide constitutional challenges to ballot access requirements by weighing the burden imposed by the requirement against the state's asserted interest.3 69 Courts apply strict
370
scrutiny to rules that impose "severe" restrictions on minor parties,
but "the state's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient
to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions." 37 1 States may
permissibly require that minor parties demonstrate a "significant"
quantum of support in the electorate to ensure manageable ballots,
protect electoral integrity37 2 and political stability,3 73 and avoid voter
confusion. 37 4 Although these interests are balanced, the essential determination remains whether the challenged ballot access laws effectively freeze the status quo by barring all candidates outside of the
major parties from the ballot.375
As one lower court noted, "[c]hallenges by third parties and independent candidates of various state regulatory schemes are no
364 See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting
that Ohio increased its ballot access requirements after Harry Wallace won 30,000 votes in
1948, while Harry Truman won the state by 7,000 votes).
365 See Richard Winger, How Ballot Access Laws Affect the U.S. Party System 24 app. A
(August 30, 1995) (unpublished manuscript presented to the American Political Science
Association, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
366 Ten states significantly increased access requirements from 1929-1960, and twenty-

five states "drastically" increased requirements between 1961-1983. Among the most notable increases: Ohio increased its requirements from 30,953 signatures to 345,570; Louisiana increased from 1,000 signatures to 91,052 members; and California increased from

23,610 signatures to 236,608 signatures. See id. at 5-8.
367

See, eg; Roberts, Note, supranote 78, at 128 ("Nearly every state requires a petition,

convention, history of previous voter support or some combination of the three ... before
[a] third party candidate can see his or her name on the ballot.").
See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
369 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
370
See, e.g., Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992).
371 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
372 See TRIBE, supra note 14, § 13-20, at 1110-11.
373 See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974).

...

368

374

375

See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715 (1974).
SeeJenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438-39 (1971).
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longer novel."37 6 By the mid-1970s, litigation over state ballot access
requirements concentrated on three primary barriers:377 (1) "signifi378 (2) filing fees,3 7 9
cant modicum of support" petition requirements,
and (3) geographic distribution requirements.38 0 The challenges expanded during the 1980s to include retention requirements, 38 1 administrative requirements and petition regulations,38 2 and laws that
restrict the pool of voters from which minor parties can gather
signatures.383
The ballot access case law is, in its most important aspects, "setfled." Prior to Anderson, lower courts eliminated the most onerous
state ballot access laws, forcing states to allow "reasonable" access to
the ballot.384 Applying Anderson, however, courts have consistently upSocialist Workers Party v. Hechler, 890 F.2d 1303, 1304 (4th Cir. 1989).
See Developments, supranote 80, at 1139-51 (synthesis of the major developments in
electoral law in the mid-1970s).
378 See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 740 (1974) (remanding to district court to
determine whether requiring 325,000 signatures in twenty-four days constituted an unconstitutional burden); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783 (1974) (holding requirement of 22,000 signatures is constitutionally acceptable).
379 See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (a state cannot require indigent
candidates to pay a filing fee when there are no reasonable alternative means to ballot
access).
380 See, e.g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 818-19 (1969).
381
Retention statutes require a minor party to win a certain percentage of the vote to
maintain its ballot status. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d
1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1995) (challenging retention statute requiring two percent of vote in
previous election and ten percent in the subsequent election to gain and maintain a position on the ballot).
382 The statutes require certain information to appear on the petition, such as the
voters' ward, and they require specific procedures, like notarization of the petition signatures. See, e.g., Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48, 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding statute
requiring the election district, assembly district, and ward to appear on the petition).
383 See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party v. Hechler, 890 F.2d 1803, 1308, 1310 (4th Cir.
1989) (invalidating a requirement that a signatory of a nominating petition must also declare a desire to vote for the candidate in a general election).
384 See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (state filing fees); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, (1968) (signatures of fifteen percent of the electorate); Blomquist v. Thomson, 789 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1984) (party recognition statute requiring a congressional
candidate to poll at least ten percent of the vote); McLain v. Meyer, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir.
1980) (15,000 signatures 150 days before the general election); American Party v.Jernigan,
424 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Ark. 1977) (deadlines for filing petitions to establish political parties were unconstitutionally vague and seven percent petition requirement was excessive);
Lendall v. Bryant, 387 F. Supp. 397 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (15% petition requirement is unconstitutional as applied to independent candidates); Baird v. Davoren, 346 F. Supp. 515 (D.
Mass. 1972) (geographic distribution requirements); American Indep. Party v. Cenarrusa,
442 P.2d 766 (Idaho 1968) (statute limiting ballot access to nominee of political parties; to
constitute a political party, the organization must have placed three candidates on the
general election ballot and have one candidate receive 10% of the vote). Eugene McCarthy
and John Anderson challenged, with surprising success, the laws of fifteen states. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981); Anderson v. Hooper, 632 F.2d 116 (10th
Cir. 1980); McCarthy v. Tribbitt, 421 F. Supp. 1193 (D. Del. 1976); McCarthy v. Askew, 420
F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Fla. 1976). The success of these candidates in the lower courts
prompted some observers to call those decisions a 'bloodless revolution." See Roberts,
376
377
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held onerous ballot access requirements, 3 8 5 and the body of precedent that courts have generated in these cases indicates that future
ballot access challenges are unlikely to significantly improve the legal
position of minor parties. As a result, the courts will not remove the
legal obstacles state legislatures place before minor parties.3 8 6
In a sense, the methodology used to analyze ballot access laws
foretold the eventual end of successful challenges to state ballot access
laws. A typical ballot access scheme requires that a minor party gather
the requisite number of signatures from voters or party enrollees and
submit these signatures, in strict accordance with certain procedural
criteria, by a deadline well before the election.3 8 7 Because courts generally analyze ballot access statutes by making state-by-state comparisons, if a few states enact similar statutes, courts are reluctant to
overturn these legislative determinations.3 8 8 The initial upper-bound
that is established in this comparative analysis quickly becomes entrenched. As the Eleventh Circuit explained:
Obviously any percentage or numerical requirement is "necessarily
arbitrary." Once a percentage or number of signatures is established, it would probably be impossible to defend it as either compelled or least drastic....

Any numerical requirement could be

challenged and judicially reduced, and then again, and again until
it did not exist at all.3 89
Note, supra note 78, at 132 n.30. In fact, the Williams decision was originally interpreted by
some commentators as establishing a right of candidacy, which would have seriously restricted the ability of states to enact ballot access laws. See Developments, supra note 80, at
1135 (reviewing commentary).
385
See infra text accompanying notes 392-433.
386 Commentators have described the case law as favorable to the two major parties, see
Porto, supranote 4, at 308, and "leaving intact the greatest barriers to ballot access," Smith,
Note, supra note 38, at 193.
387 See generallyTRIBE, supra note 14, § 13-20, at 1101-09 (providing an overview of the
doctrine).
388
See, e.g., Manifold v. Blunt, 863 F.2d 1368, 1373 (8th Cir. 1988) (reasoning that the
timing of presidential elector certifications is necessarily arbitrary and any particular date is
"difficult to defend" as the least restrictive); Libertarian Party v. Davis, 766 F.2d 865 (4th
Cir. 1985) (discussing same problem with geographic signature distribution
requirements).
389 Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 793 (11th Cir. 1983) (internal citation
omitted). Justice Blackmun has voiced an analogous concern about the application of
strict scrutiny to ballot access laws: "[F] or me, 'less drastic means' is a slippery slope .... A
judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not come up with something a little less
'drastic' or a little less 'restrictive' in almost any situation, and thereby enable himself to
vote to strike legislation down." Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party,
440 U.S. 173, 188 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring); see alsoMclauglin v. North Carolina
Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1222 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[I]t is beyond judicial competence to
identify, as an objective and abstract matter, the precise numbers and percentages that
would constitute the least restrictive means to advance the states's avowed and compelling
interests."), cert. denied 1165 S. Ct. 1320 (1996); McLain v. Meier, 851 F.2d 1045, 1050 (8th
Cir. 1988) ("A litigant could always point to a [filing] day slightly later that would not
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The same logic applies to any numerically-based requirement; after an upper boundary is set, courts are reluctant to challenge its validity in a particular context or situation.39 0 Now, if other states use
similar laws, courts will overturn ballot access laws only when minor
parties can show that the statute is arbitrary or is not related to a legiti39 1
mate state interest.
B. The Supreme Court Ballot Access Jurisprudence: Establishing
the Undue Burden Standard
The fact remains that the Supreme Court has allowed very difficult ballot access requirements to withstand court scrutiny. In Storer v.
Brown,3 92 the Court held that it could not determine, without a factual
determination of the size of the available signer pool, whether a California scheme that required voters to collect 325,000 signatures in
twenty-four days constituted an impermissible burden on minor parties.3 93 Furthermore, although the Court in Williams v. Rhodes struck
down a provision requiring minor parties to collect the signatures of
fifteen percent of the number of voters who voted in the preceding
gubernatorial election, 39 4 the Court upheld a five percent registered
voter requirement in Jenness v. Fortson.395 These precedents enable
states to defend quite onerous ballot access requirements. 39 6 Moreover, when balancing the burden imposed by ballot access statutes,
the Court has demonstrated a marked deference to the state's asserted interests in ensuring fair and honest elections, eliminating
voter confusion, maintaining political stability, and discouraging frivolous candidates. 397 By denoting a variety of these state interests as
"compelling," laws that implicate these interests can, and do, survive
significantly alter a state's interest until the point at which primary elections could not be
held at all.").
390 See Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1983) (upholding regulation of time allowed for petitioning efforts).
391
See, e.g., Patriot Party v. Mitchell, 826 F. Supp. 926, 941 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
392 415 U.S. 724 (1974). Lower federal courts cite this result as indicating that the
court approved of the signature requirement in question. See, e.g., Schulz v. Williams, 44
F.3d 48, 56 (2d Cir. 1994).
393 Storer, 415 U.S. at 738.
394 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
395 403 U.S. 431,441 (1971). To distinguish the statute, the Court relied on a number
of facts in addition to the lower signature requirement, i.e., the availability of write-in voting, the lack of a required primary for minor parties, more reasonable filing deadlines and
a wide pool of voters who could sign petitions. See id. at 438-40.
396 See, e.g, Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 795 (11th Cir. 1983) (relying on
Storer to uphold state law requiring minor parties to gather an estimated 220,000
signatures).
397 See Porto, supra note 4, at 311 (criticizing the Court for overestimating the importance of the asserted state interests).
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strict scrutiny. 398 In addition, the state is not required to demonstrate
empirically the need for such restrictions. 39 9
Finally, the Supreme Court's opinions reflect a view of political
behavior by the electorate that severely underestimates the burden
state electoral laws actually impose on minor parties. The inquiry asks
whether a reasonably diligent candidate could satisfy the state requirements. 40 0 Rather than grounding this hypothetical candidate in the
reality of third party organization, however, the Court states that a
third party candidate should be able to attract 1,000 volunteers, who
would gather fourteen signatures per day for twenty-four days, in or40 1
der to fulfill a state signature requirement of 325,000 signatures.
By comparison, the Court's decisions protecting minor parties
are of limited practical significance. Minor parties' claims are successful only when the "challenged ballot-access restrictions . . . virtually
preclude[ ] electoral activity by those candidates." 40 2 The Court has
held that early filing deadlines for independent candidates are unconstitutional, 40 3 and that a state may not require more signatures for an
office in a smaller political district than in a larger one. 40 4 In short,
the Supreme Court has created a ballot-access doctrine that is antagonistic to the interests of third parties, and the application of this doctrine by the lower courts is generally consistent with these precedents.
The second factor limiting the future potential of ballot access
litigation is the courts' use of the "totality approach" to analyze ballot
access schemes. This approach considers the burden imposed by a
given statute in light of the state's overall election scheme. 40 5 In other
words, courts often do not consider just a particular statute, but consider the burden imposed by all the states' electoral laws operating
398
See Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[U]nlike other areas in
which strict scrutiny has been employed, its invocation in election law cases has not preordained their outcome.").
399 See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986); Hagelin for President Comm. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 960 (10th Cr. 1994); Libertarian Party v. Roberts, 750
P.2d 1147, 1154 (Or. 1988).
400
See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974).
401
402

See id. at 740.

Porto, suPranote 4, at 308.
403
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). This holding has lessened the
problem of early filing provision for minor party candidates only marginally however. See
infra Part II.C.2.
404 See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
405 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1223 (4th
Cir. 1995) (upholding combination signature requirements and vote requirements to
maintain place on ballot), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996); Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d
48, 55 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding New York requirement that independent nominating
petition contain each signer's election district, assembly district and ward); Larouche v.
Kezer, 990 F.2d 36, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1993) (upholding Connecticut media recognition statute); McLain v. Meier, 851 F.2d 1045, 1049 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding North Dakota signature requirements and early filing deadline).
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together. This doctrinal approach discourages future ballot access
challenges by minor parties because, if a court approves a state's entire
ballot access system, a subsequent court is unlikely to second-guess
this determination if minor parties later challenge an individual statute in the same state. After Williams, for example, the Supreme Court
approved state electoral laws "in toto" in Georgia 40 6 and Texas. 40 7 After Anderson, the lower courts approved the entire body of election
laws in North Carolina, 408 Florida,40 9 Oklahoma, 4 10 Maine, 4 11 Wash4 15
Missouri, 416
ington, 412 West Virginia, 413 North Dakota,4 14 Virginia,

and Connecticut. 417 Rather than proceed in a purely piecemeal fashion courts can uphold the entire electoral scheme at once. Of course,
a court is not precluded from finding a single ballot access law unconstitutionally burdensome in a particular state after the state's overall
scheme has survived court scrutiny.4 18 However, by analyzing the entirety of the state's electoral laws, the courts make challenging those
laws individually more difficult and less likely to succeed. 4 19 The totality approach increases the weight of litigated cases and discourages
406

407
408

SeeJenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
See McLaughlin, 65 F.3d 1215 (4th Cir. 1995).

See Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1983).
410 See Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd, 844 F.2d 740 (10th Cir.
1988).
411 See Libertarian Party v. Diamond, 992 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1993).
412
See Libertarian Party v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 1994).
413
See Socialist Workers Party v. Hechler, 890 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1989).
414
See McLain v. Meier, 851 F.2d 1045 (8th Cir. 1988); McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159
(8th Cir. 1980).
415
See Libertarian Party v. Davis, 766 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1985).
416 See Libertarian Party v. Bond, 764 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1985).
417 See Larouche v. Kezer, 990 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1993).
418
See, e.g., Pilcher v. Rains, 853 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding Texas provision
requiring the placement of voter registration numbers on the ballot access provision unconstitutional after the state's electoral laws had undergone a "totality" analysis).
419 To demonstrate this analytical process, consider the current controversy over laws
that require a statewide showing of "significant support" before granting ballot access for
minor party candidates seeking local offices. Statutes that premise a political party's ballot
access for all local offices entirely on the statewide support received by that party's gubernatorial or presidential candidate impose serious burdens on minor parties seeking to begin a "grassroots" organizational strategy. See McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1223-24. For
example, North Carolina will not allow a minor party to place a candidate on the ballot for
a local political office without gathering signatures of two percent of the statewide electorate. See id. at 1223. As a result, even if a minor party candidate won a local office as an
independent candidate "her ability to designate her party affiliation for purposes of reelection would be conditioned on the party's ability to register support elsewhere." Id. at 1223.
The Supreme Court had never expressly ruled on the problem of predicating local access
on statewide support. See id. at 1225. Because in American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781
(1974), the Supreme Court approved the electoral laws in Texas "taken as a whole," however, and Texas required a statewide showing of support to gain access to the local ballot,
the Fourth Circuit determined that the Court had implicitly approved the particular Texas
statute. See McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1125 n.10-11.
409
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litigation over state electoral laws that have already received broad, if
not detailed and individually considered, scrutiny.
C.

Statute-Specific Challenges to Ballot Access Laws

Despite courts' use of the totality approach, minor party challenges to specific statutes remain standard fare. Most states, however,
have successfully defended the most important legal barriers to third
party success, and they are quite sophisticated at creating statutes that
increase the cost of minor party activity, without overstepping constitutional bounds. 420 This Part summarizes the major legal obstacles to
minor party access to the political system.
1.

Signature Requirements: Establishinga Modicum of Support in the
Electorate

The signature petition imposes the greatest costs on third parties
seeking ballot placement.4 2' Currently, no state employs a signature
requirement that is greater than five percent of registered voters. 42 2
Therefore, challenges based purely on the number of signatures are
probably not viable in light ofJenness v. Forston.4 23 To attack the minimum support requirements, minor parties challenged a combination
of signature requirements and other ballot access requirements that
increase the burden imposed on the party. The most important recent minor party challenges involved the combination of high signature requirements and "retention requirements." These
combinations of statutes require a party to collect signatures to gain a
place on the ballot and then invalidate a party's ballot-qualified status
420 For example, in 1995, Maine amended its signature requirements to require a new
party to enroll five percent of the states registered voters in the party-rather than just
require them to sign a petition-before the party can participate in the primary. ME. REv.
STATE. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 303 (West 1995). In Kansas, a candidate's petition circulator must
live in the same precinct as the petition signer. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-303 (1986).
421 The cost for Ross Perot's Reform Party to become ballot qualified in 50 states will
run into the "tens of millions of dollars." Sam Howe Verhovek, Perot as a PoliticalPresence,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at A10. If the party wishes to become a true national party and
run candidates for all federal offices, according to one calculation, the party members will
need to gather 3,501,629 valid signatures nationwide. See Winger, supra note 365, at 8. In
order to appear on the ballot in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, in 1992 a new
party presidential candidate needed to gather 640,000 petition signatures, and 79,300 new

party registrants. See Katz & Kolodny, supra note 2, at 30.
422 See EDwARD D. FEIGENBAUM & JAMES A. PALMER, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,
BALLOT AccEss 1: ISSUES AND OPI'ONs 69 (1988) (noting that the range is from 25 signatures for congressional offices to five percent of registered voters).
423 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (finding that five percent of vote cast in preceding election is
constitutional). See also Hall v. Simcox, 766 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1985) (two percent of
vote); Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1983) (three percent of vote);
Populist Party v. Herschler, 746 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1984) (five percent); Arutunoff v.
Oklahoma State Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1982) (five percent); Beller v Adams, 235 So. 2d 502, 508 (Fla. 1970) (slightly more than five percent).
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for the next election if the party's candidate does not receive a certain
percentage of the vote, usually ten to twenty percent.4 4 Because the
major parties always poll higher than these percentages, these statutes
ensure that they have automatic access to the general election ballot.
Minor parties object to these statutes because, once a party has
demonstrated a modicum of support, the failure of a party to poll a
much higher percentage on election day does not mean the party
lacks the necessary electoral support required for ballot access in the
next election. 4 25 The state electoral laws thus combine "to ensure that
the [minor party] ...expend[s] great effort to obtain statewide and
local ballot access.., only to lose that access in toto immediately thereafter."426 Despite the fact that under Anderson some courts found that
these schemes imposed severe burdens, 427 courts uniformly rejected
428
minor party challenges to them.
Similarly, courts have been quite willing to approve of other
methods states use to increase the cost of petition drives. States can
require that signatures be geographically distributed throughout the
state,4 29 and that each individual candidate circulate his or her own
petition. 43 0 States can require that any voter who signs a petition for a
minor party candidate must forfeit his or her right to vote in a party
primary,43 ' which severely reduces the pool of voters who are generally willing to sign petitions. 43 2 States can also adopt onerous administrative and procedural requirements that govern the petition
process. 43 3 Moreover, other candidates can challenge the signature
424

See McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
425

See, e.g., McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1222-23; Patriot Party v. Mitchell, 826 F. Supp. 926,

934 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
426 McLaughlin, 65 F.3d at 1224.
427 See, e.g., id. at 1221 ("[T]he burden that North Carolina's ballot access restrictions
impose on protected interests is undoubtedly severe-that is, as history reveals, those regulations make it extremely difficult for any 'third party' to participate in electoral politics.").
428 See id. at 1222-23 (two percent signature and ten percent vote requirements); Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd, 844 F.2d 740, 741-42 (10th Cir. 1988) (five
percent signature and ten percent vote requirements); Libertarian Party v. Davis, 766 F.2d
865, 867 (4th Cir. 1985) (.5% signature and ten percent vote requirements); Arutunoff v.
Oklahoma State Election Bd., 687 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (10th Cir. 1982) (same); PatriotParty,
826 F. Supp. at 935 (two percent signature and fifteen percent vote requirements).
429 See Libertarian Party v. Bond, 764 F.2d 538, 543 (8th Cir. 1985); Udall v. Bowen,
419 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. Ind.), afi'd, 425 U.S. 947 (1976).
430 See National Prohibition Party v. Colorado, 752 P.2d 80, 84 (Colo. 1988).
431 See Socialist Workers Party v. Hechler, 890 F.2d 1303 (4th Cir. 1989) (upholding
state law disqualifying from participation in primary elections voters who signed nominating petitions for minor party candidates).
432 See i& at 1305.
433 In Schulz v. Williams, 44 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit upheld New
York's much maligned requirement that the election district, assembly district, and ward
must be indicated for every voter who signs an independent nominating petition. Id. at 5556. Because the statute allowed other candidates to challenge the signatures, the require-
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petitions of minor party candidates for failure to adhere to the letter
of the requirements. 4 4
These cases, as a whole, indicate that the most important mechanisms states use to increase the cost of gaining ballot access survive
court scrutiny. The cost of signature drives is the central mechanism
to thwarting minor-party ballot access. Yet, the legal barriers blocking
minor-party ballot access will remain largely as they are. Thus, it is fair
to conclude that since Anderson, the minor parties have not significandy benefitted from the Supreme Court's doctrine regulating political parties in this crucial area.
2.

FilingDeadlines

Courts also allow states to require that minor party candidates
submit nominating petitions much earlier in the election year than
independent candidates or the major parties. States routinely require
minor parties and independent candidates to submit their signature
petitions and often a declaration of their candidates' candidacy by a
specified date. 43 5 The constitutionality of filing deadlines, however, is
less settled than the signature requirements case law. After Anderson,
both minor parties and independent candidates enjoyed some success
challenging state deadlines that required the submission of petition
signatures before June 1 of an election year.43 6 However, some courts
interpreting Anderson have developed different standards based on
4 37
whether the candidate is a minor party or independent candidate.
These courts claim that political party and independent candidate activity are different because the goal of a minor party is to gain control
of the state government; thus, states have a greater interest in their
ment actually doubled the amount of signatures needed to withstand scrutiny-from
15,000 to 30,000. See id. at 57. If the number of signatures required is large, the effect is
magnified. See Libertarian Party v. Florida, 710 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1983) (noting that
the minor party needed to collect 220,000 signatures to ensure that they had 144,492 valid
ones). Another administrative technique requires that "the witness be from the same congressional district as the petition signer." SeeLibertarianParty, 766 F.2d at 869.
434 See, e.g., Schultz, 44 F.3d at 57 (discussing challenges based on failure of petition to
identify election district, assembly district, and ward for each signer).
435

See generally FEIGENMAUM & PALMER, supra note 422, 18-19 (addressing implications

of early filing deadlines, particularly when combined with numerical signature
requirements).
436
See, e.g., Blomquist v. Thomson, 739 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The June 1
deadline prevents a new party from seeking support at a time when such support is most
likely to crystallize-after the established political parties have put forth their candidates
and platforms."); Libertarian Party v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 593 F. Supp. 118, 122
(W.D. Okla. 1984) (petitioning period from March 1st to May 29th); Stoddard v. Quinn,
593 F. Supp. 300 (D. Me. 1984) (April 1st deadline).
437 See, e.g., Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 746 n.9
(10th Cir. 1988); Cromer v. South Carolina, 917 F.2d 819, 823 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[Als between new (third) party candidacies and independent candidacies, independent candidacies must be accorded even more protection than third party candidacies.").
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regulation. 438 In addition, some courts limit Anderson's holding to
presidential elections because states have less interest in regulating national elections, which have ramifications that extend beyond the
state's borders, than in state or local elections. 43 9 Because minor parties run candidates for state and local office, this characterization of
the case provides further support for early filing deadlines.
The result: minor parties are required to submit nomination papers far in advance of independent candidates. States employ filing
deadlines for minor parties that are more than six months earlier than
those imposed for independent candidates, 440 and courts have approved deadlines requiring filing more than 200 days before the general election. 44 1 These deadlines create an incentive for independent
candidates-candidates who probably would be predisposed to consider a minor party affiliation-to not affiliate in order to have extra
time to satisfy petition requirements.
3. Minor Party Successes: When States Have No Legitimate Interest

When courts have invalidated state ballot access laws, these legal
victories have been of limited significance to minor parties. For example, some minor parties successfully challenged state laws controlling
the content of forms used to gather signatures during petition drives
See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 745 (1974).
439 SeeAnderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-95 (1983) (discussing the variation of
state interests in state and national elections); Rainbow Coalition, 844 F.2d at 746 n. 9.
(relying on the distinction to justify early filing deadline for minor party); Dart v. Brown,
717 F.2d 1491, 1503 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The [Anderson] Court was divided five to four, and
the majority placed heavy emphasis on the strong national, and diminished state, interest
in presidential elections."); Stevenson v. State Board of Elections, 638 F. Supp. 547, 552
(N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 794 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1986). But see Goldman-Frankie v. Austin, 727
F.2d 603, 607 (6th Cir. 1984) (refusing to restrict the Court's holding in Anderson to only
national elections); Cripps v. Seneca County Bd. of Elections, 629 F. Supp. 1335, 1348
(N.D. Ohio 1985) (same).
440
For example, California requires minor parties to file in October of the year prior
to the election, but allows independent candidates to file as late as August 9 of the election
year. North Dakota requires that minor parties file in December of the year prior to the
election, but allows independent candidates to file September 6 of the election year. Similarly, Maine requires minor parties to file in December of the prior year, but allows independent candidates to file in June of the election year. 1996 Petitioningfor President
BALLOT AccEss NEWS (COFOE, San Francisco, Cal.) January 14, 1996, at 5.
See, e.g., Mctain v. Meier, 851 F.2d 1045, 1049-51 (8th Cir. 1988); see alsoAmerican
441
Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 787 n.18 (1974) (filing deadline 120 days before election is
constitutional); Libertarian Party v. Bond, 764 F.2d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 1985) (filing deadline 91 days before general election and one week before primary is constitutional); U.S.
Taxpayers Party v. Smith, 871 F. Supp. 426, 434 (N.D. Fla. 1993) (upholding deadline 120
days before general election for minor party). Minor parties are succeeding in challenging
some early filing requirements that take place before these dates. See Libertarian Party v.
Ehrler, 776 F. Supp. 1200, 1205-06 (E.D. Ky. 1991) (invalidating deadline 119 days prior to
the primary elections and 280 days prior to the general election). But cf.Stevenson v. State
Bd. of Elections, 638 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill.), af/'d, 794 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1986) (approving a deadline 323 days before general election for independent candidates).
438
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on the grounds that the forms were designed to dissuade voters from
signing.44 2 Courts have rejected state laws requiring petition signers
to state their intention to vote for a minor party candidate. 44 3 However, the Fourth Circuit has approved a statute requiring nominating
petitions to indicate that the signer intends to become an active party
organizer.4 " Therefore, these minor successes still leave the state
considerable discretion to formulate antagonistic language on
petitions.
Minor-party challenges are more effective when there is clear evidence of unequal treatment in comparison to independent or other
similarly situated candidates, and the state cannot articulate an accept44 6
able reason to justify it.44 5 Thus, for example, in Fulaniv. Krivanek,
the Eleventh Circuit invalidated a Florida statute that allowed the state
to waive a ten cent signature verification fee for independent candidates seeking access to the ballot, but explicitly prohibited minor parties from receiving a waiver.44 7 The state failed to produce a state
interest to justify imposing the disparate burden on minor parties as
opposed to independents. 48 Under Krivanek, a state may not impermissibly distinguish between similarly situated candidates or organizations without a valid justification. 44 9
442 See McLaughlin v. North Carolina Bd. of Elections, 65 F.3d 1215, 1227 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied 116 S. Ct. 1320 (1996).
443 See Socialist Workers Party v. Hechler, 890 F.2d 1803, 1309 (4th Cir. 1989).
444 See id. The Fourth Circuit's holding in McLaughlin on this point seems to be in
considerable tension with a number of decisions in which district courts rejected the contention that a petition signer must enroll in the party or state their allegiance to the party's
principles. See Workers World Party v. Vigil-Giron, 693 F. Supp. 989 (D.N.M. 1988) (invalidating statute requiring party membership in order to sign ballot access petition); Libertarian Party v. Swackhamer, 638 F. Supp. 565, 568 (D. Nev. 1986) (invalidating statement of
allegiance to party principles requirement); Libertarian Party v. Kundert, 579 F. Supp. 735,
739 (D.S.D. 1984) (similar); Libertarian Party v. Beermann, 598 F. Supp. 57 (D. Neb. 1984)
(similar); North Carolina Socialist Workers Party v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections,
538 F. Supp. 864 (E.D.N.C. 1982) (invaliding law that automatically enrolled all petition
signers in the new party and informed voters of this change on the petition).
445 In contrast, minor parties are not injured "merely by the fact that they are treated
differently from major parties." Libertarian Party v. Munro, 31 F.3d 759, 765 (9th Cir.
1994). See alsoAmerican Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.13 (1974) (holding that states
are not required to treat major and minor parties the same).
446 973 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992).
447 See id.
448 See id. at 1546-48.
449 But see Unity Party v. Wallace, 707 F.2d 59, 60 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that statute
that only required person nominated by "independent bodies" to file acknowledgment of
candidacies, but did not require the same of political parties, did not violate equal protection). States can impose more onerous requirements on minor-party candidates than on
independent candidates if the state's justification is adequate and is related to the distinction. See, e.g., Rainbow Coalition v. Oklahoma State Election Bd., 844 F.2d 740, 746 n.9
(10th Cir. 1988). The required state interests are not particularly weighty; they include
ensuring that the party label has meaning, see id. at 746 n.9, and that party candidates have

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:109

Finally, a minor party may be successful if a state regulation has
no legitimate purpose. For example, a state has no legitimate interest
in requiring more signatures for local elections than for statewide
elections,450 or for relatively less significant offices than for higher offices. Thus, in PatriotParty v. Mitchell 451 the court invalidated a Pennsylvania statute that required judicial candidates to gather more
signatures than presidential or gubernatorial candidates.4 2 Again,
the significance of these cases is minor. These statutes are often the
result of "historical accident" 453 and do little to reduce the cost of
gaining ballot access.
4. Summary
Since Anderson, minor parties have been almost uniformly unsuccessful in challenging important state ballot access restrictions. Their
few victories have had little political importance. Although minor parties enjoyed a few meaningful successes early on, those favorable decisions did not significantly reduce the cost of attaining ballot access.
Indeed, gaining access to a ballot continues to cost millions of dollars.
Moreover, the cost of organizing a party remains high and is unlikely
to change short of direct legislative action by the Congress or the state
legislatures-an event not likely to come to pass.45 4 The current sys-

tem of ballot access remains highly biased against minor party organization, while the major parties enjoy ever more freedom from state
control.

adequate intraparty support, see Krivanek, 973 F.2d at 1546 (citing Macbride v. Askew, 541
F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1976)).
450
See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 282 (1992); Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist
Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
451
Patriot Party v. Mitchell, 826 F. Supp. 926 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
452
See id.; cf. Gjersten v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 791 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1986)
(invalidating statute requiring ward committeeman candidates to gather more signatures
that township committeeman candidates when the two offices were the same).
453
See Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 187.
454 The last attempt to regulate state ballot access for federal elections did not fare
well. House Bill 1582, 99th Cong. (1985), submitted to the Sub-Committee on Elections of
the House Administration Committee, established consistent standards for state regulation
of federal ballot-access requirements, but left the states the discretion to regulate within
federally prescribed guidelines. See Francine Miller, Note, Fairness in the Election Arena:
CongressionalRegulation of FederalBallot Access, 32 N.Y.L. Son. L. REv. 903, 913 (1987).
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III
THE POLITICAL

AND

DocrNAL

CONSEQUENCES OF THE

STATE REGULATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

A. Doctrinal Tension Between the Associational Rights and
Ballot Access Cases
As courts have strengthened the associational rights of political
parties and the ballot access case law has become more entrenched
and settled, tensions have begun to emerge between the two doctrines. Courts tend to treat the ballot access and associational rights
case law as discrete and independent categories of cases. 4 55 The associational rights cases protect political parties' First Amendment rights,
whereas the ballot access cases place some limits on what states can
require as conditions of entry to the political process. Yet on a deeper
level, both lines of cases are involved in same enterprise-limiting the
burden of state laws on political parties. The distinction the courts
appear to draw seems somewhat artificial. Ballot access law is simply
one way that state law impinges on parties' freedom to pursue their
political goals.
Because these laws are intertwined, as courts expand the associational rights of political parties but defer to state regulations when
minor parties challenge ballot access laws, the courts create inconsistencies within doctrines. A comparison of the rationales used to justify "bifurcated electoral systems"-electoral systems that create
separate ballot access systems for major and minor parties456-reveals
this tension. In the seminal ballot-access case, Jenness v. Fortson,45 7 the
Court held that a minor party's associational rights were not infringed
by a statute that ensured automatic access to the ballot for the major
parties, but required minor parties to gather the signatures of at least
five percent of the state's registered voters.458 The Court reasoned
that this disparate treatment was justified because the states required
the major parties to maintain burdensome party structures.4 59 A similar rationale was employed in American Party v. White,460 in which the
Court upheld a state statute requiring minor parties to nominate by
statewide convention. 461 According to the Court, the convention process was not invidiously more burdensome than a state-mandated primary because state law required the major parties to hold "precinct,
455

1995).

See, e.g., Republican Party v. Faulkner County, 49 F.Sd 1289, 1292-94 (8th Cir.

456
457

See, e.g., American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).

458

See id- at 441.

459
460
461

See id.
415 U.S. 767 (1974).
See id.

403 U.S. 431 (1971).
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county, and state conventions to adopt and promulgate party plat2
forms and to conduct other business."4
With the expansion of major political parties' associational rights
in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,463 the Jenness
Court's claim that states can mandate that the major parties maintain
onerous organizational structures has become increasingly tenuous.
State provisions that dictate the specific organizational structures of
party governing bodies and party nomination procedures directly implicate associational rights; thus, the state must put forth compelling
reasons to justify them. 4 64 It is precisely the state's regulation of the
internal affairs of the political party that the Supreme Court's decision
in Eu 4 65 and the Eleventh Circuit's rejection of state-mandated partyfunded primaries in Faulknei46 render of dubious constitutionality.
However, when courts analyze whether a state ballot access law is unduly burdensome under Anderson, they consider whether the major
party is required to hold state conventions. 46 7 Similarly, in American
Party the Supreme Court noted that requiring complex nominating
conventions throughout the state "is unrelated to ballot qualification
and corresponds more to the democratic management of the political
party's internal affairs. '468 Thus, state-mandated organizational structures and internal nomination procedures in state-mandated conventions, a central factor that justified the disparate treatment of major
and minor parties in the Supreme Court's ballot access jurisprudence,
might be unconstitutional. If this is the case, then the differential
treatment that minor parties receive cannot be justified on this basis.
The substantial support requirements in the ballot access case law
also conflict with the associational rights cases granting political parties the power to decide which voters may participate in their primaies. In Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,4 69 the Court upheld a "blanket
primary," in which registered voters may vote for any candidate of
their choice, irrespective of the candidates' or voters' party affiliation. 470 A Democrat, for example, could vote for Pat Buchanan or
David Duke as the Republican nominee. If the nominated minor
party candidate won their election and received at least one percent
of the overall vote for an office, that candidate qualified for the gen462
463
464

Id. at 781.
489 U.S. 214 (1989). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 138-41.
489 U.S. at 229.

465

See supra text accompanying notes 183-88.

466

See supra Part I.D.2.

467 Socialist Workers Party v. Hechler, 890 F.2d 1303, 1306 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[M]inor
parties under [the ballot access laws] are spared the necessity of having .. . precinct,
county, and state conventions, a not inconsiderable burden in itself.").
468

American Party, 415 U.S. at 784 n.15.

469

479 U.S. 189 (1986).

470

See id. at 192.
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eral election ballot on the party's banner.4 7 ' This procedure represented the sole path to the ballot. The Socialist Workers Party
claimed that the law was unduly burdensome under the traditional
ballot access case law, but the Court upheld the primary scheme because the state was free to require an initial showing of electoral support.472 Under the associational rights case law, however, the
argument against state mandated open primaries is much stronger. A
state-mandated "blanket" primary allows nonaffiliated voters to determine the minor parties' nominees for the general election. In Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,473 the Court upheld the
Democratic Party's rejection of the results of a primary election mandating an open primary and in Tashjian v. Republican Pary 47 4 the
Court rejected Connecticut's prohibition on independents voting in
the Republican primary. Under these precedents, it is questionable
whether a state can mandate that a minor party accept the results of a
primary that forces the minor party to associate with non-party members, absent clear indication by the Court that minor parties do not
have the same associational rights as major parties. Munro was decided in 1986, before the Court's decisions in Tashjian and Eu. As a
result, the effects of the primary on minor parties' associational rights
were not discussed. Although the states have the discretion to require
a modicum of support, it is not clear that this discretion extends to
the utilization of a primary scheme that interferes with ability of the
party to select its standard bearer..
B.

Structural Obstacles to the Creation of Third Parties

As this Note demonstrates, the law treats major and minor parties
very differently. Political scientists and legal commentators recognize
that the barriers to entry created by the major parties in state legislatures contribute to the monopoly enjoyed by the Democrats and
Republicans. 4 75 It is therefore useful to ask whether this disparate
treatment is necessary. The persistence of the two major parties in
American politics, and the two-party system itself, has provided the
focus for much academic debate. 4 76 This Note will not repeat these
arguments. However, it should be noted that law appears to be but471
472

See id.

See id. at 199.

See Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981).
479 U.S. 208 (1986).
See e.g., Lawson, supranote 7, at 243-47; Katz & Kolodny, supranote 2, at 46 ("[O]ne
might well wonder why the [Democrats and Republicans] persist at all ....
The two
parties enjoy... important advantages, and benefit from a variety of institutional barrier to
the entry of any new parties. Officials elected on the slates of the two parties are, of course,
the ones who gave themselves these advantages.").
476
See Keefe, supra note 59, at 61-66; Smith, Note, supra note 38, at 203-06.
473
474
475
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tressing the political hegemony of the major parties at the expense of
political expression and competition. States claim that ballot access
laws are needed because a proliferation of minor parties will cause
political instability and factionalism. 47 7 Even without formal legal barriers, the American political system is highly antagonistic to political
actors outside the two-party system. Although political scientists have
observed that ballot access restrictions discourage the formation and
continuation of third parties, the greatest barriers to the creation of
third parties are endemic to the fundamental structure of the political
system itself. In particular, two factors discourage the creation and
maintenance of minor political parties. The most obvious and, to
many commentators, the most important, is expressed in Duverger's
Law: "The simple-majority single ballot system favors the two-party system." 478 In an electoral system in which a plurality victor-the candidate who obtains the most votes-receives the entire political reward,
small political parties are penalized because if they do not win that
plurality, they receive nothing.4 7 9 This structure creates an incentive
for practical parties to combine efforts in an attempt to win that "magical" plurality. 48 0 Moreover, as Douglas W. Rae observed in his seminal work on the political impact of electoral law:
[T]he perceived effects of electoral systems may be just as important
as their actual consequences. Electoral systems thought to do violence to small parties will eliminate them before the election because
their leaders decide against the contest. The idea that an electoral

477 See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974) (noting that states can protect
against the potential damage to the democratic system that splintered parties could cause);
New Alliance Party v. Hand, 933 F.2d 1568, 1572 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991) (conceding claim
that Alabama had an interest in ensuring "the winners are a choice of a majority of at least
a strong plurality of those voting ... and to avoid the possibility of unrestrained factionalism at the general election").
478 MAuRICE DUVERGER, PoLmcAL PARTns 217 (Barbara North & Robert North trans.,
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1954) (1951).
479 Generally, leading political parties receive "disproportionately large shares of parliamentary seats, other less successful parties must in turn receive disproportionately small
parcels of seats." DOUGLAS W. RAE, THE POLrrXCAL CONSEQUENCES OF ELECrORAL LAws 77
(1967); see also KEEFE, supra note 59, at 5-6 (describing the incentives created by singlemember plurality districts).
480 The Electoral College strengthens this incentive structure. See REIcHLEY, supra note
6, at 36. By awarding presidential delegates only if a candidate receives the plurality of the
vote in an entire state, outsider candidates have a difficult time winning any electoral votes.

Ross Perot, for example, received 18.9% of the popular vote in 1992, but received no electoral votes. However, when the candidate's support is concentrated in a geographic area,

the minor party candidate can win electoral votes. Thus, George Wallace won 13% of the
vote in 1968 and received a roughly proportionate percentage of the electoral vote. See
KEEFE, supra note 60, at 65. The effect of the Electoral College is so strong that in James
Reichley's view, "[i]f it is ever pulled, the two-party system will probably go with it."
REICHLEY, supra note 6, at 37.
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system refuses representation to small parties becomes a self-fulfilling hypothesis .... 481
To make matters worse, like firms that seek to maximize profits
by restricting market entry by new firms, the vote-maximizing major
political parties rationally seek to restrict the ability of minor parties to
enter the political market. 48 2 One tool they can use is the ballot access law.
Minor parties also are unlikely to succeed because the act of organizing a political party on a large scale, even in the absence of legal
barriers, is simply a difficult task. For example, organizing is a very
expensive project, but the campaign finance system is quite antagonistic to small parties. The federal government provides generous funding to the Republican and Democratic Parties. In 1992 the
government distributed about $153 million in federal funds to presidential candidates, of which $22 million funded the major parties' national conventions. 48 3 Minor parties can receive public money only in
very limited circumstances. 48 4 The disparity in funding assists the organizing efforts of the major parties, and guarantees that minor parties will remain hopelessly underfunded (with the notable exception
of Ross Perot's Reform Party).485 On this point, America compares
48 6
poorly with the other modern democracies.
The states' claims that political chaos and factionalism justify ballot access restrictions are dubious in light of the powerful incentives
already built into the structure of the political system to control the
proliferation of minor parties. 48 7 These structural impediments suggest that the two-party system would persist even without ballot access
RAF, supranote 479, at 79.
See RicHARD A. CHAMPAGNE, WHY ARE THERE No THIRD PARTiES IN THE U.S.:
DUVERGER's LAW OR PourncAL REGULATIONS? 9-10 (Dep't of Gov't, Univ. of Essex Paper in
Politics and Gov't No. 45, 1987).
483 See a=v.s, supra note 59, at 172.
484 Minor-party and independent candidates need to receive five percent of the vote in
the previous election to receive campaign financing. New parties qualify for public money
only after the election, provided they receive five percent of the vote in that election. Because the money is not disbursed until after the election, the minor party remains underfunded during the election, making it more difficult to attain the required five percent
of the vote. See id. at 169.
485 Commentators have attributed the resurgence of the political party in the election
process to the increase in funding. See id. at 320-21; KirkJ. Nahra, PoliticalParties and the
Campaign FinanceLaws: Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FoRAM L. REV. 53, 88
(1987).
486 All Austrian parties that receive more than one percent of the vote receive state
subsidies at both the national and the local level. See Wolfgang C. Mudller, The Development
of Austrian Party Organizationsin the Post-warPeriod,in How PARnES ORGANIZE, supra note 2,
at 54-55. Similarly, Danish parties receive state subsidies based on the number of votes they
receive. See Lars Bille, Denmark: The Decline of the MembershipParty?, in How PARTES ORGANIZE, supra note 2, at 145-46.
487 See Smith, Note, supra note 38, at 209.
481
482
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requirements. The question remains whether the Democrats and
Republicans have a state-created, judicially enforced right to dominant power within it. Third parties in the American political system
rarely win elections, 48 8 but they add other values to political life by
providing a vehicle for discontented voters48 9 and important policy
innovations, 490 and encouraging the major parties to stay responsive
to voters. 49 1 More importantly, however, third parties have the potential to dramatically reshape the political landscape and change the
structure of American politics forever. The Republican Party, after all,
is the most successful third party of all time. 492 As a result, perhaps
the restrictions on minor parties impose costs on society by stifling
important political activity without conferring a corresponding
benefit. 493
C.

The Law and the Creation of Stronger Parties

What are the stakes in the protection of parties against state intervention? Consider the major recent trends in party politics. The major political parties are becoming ideologically homogeneous within
their ranks. 49 4 There is little left of the moderate wings of the Republican and Democratic parties; conservative Democrats and liberal
Republicans are endangered political species. 495 Because the major
parties nominate candidates with the direct primary, however, the par49 6
ties remain quite open to participation by outsider elements.
Although this arrangement is democratic, political scientists routinely
identify the open primary as one of the primary causes of the weak488

See William B. Hasseltine, Introduction to HoWARD P. NASH, JR., THIRD PARTIES IN

AMERICAN PoLrrTcs at v (1959).
489
See Bernard C. Barmann,

Third-Party Candidatesand PresidentiaIDebates:A Proposalto
Increase VoterParticipationin NationalElections,23 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 441,444 (1990)
(discussing how third parties encourage "candidates to discuss ideas and programs they
might otherwise avoid and offer a constructive means of expressing discontent").
490 See Smith, Note, supranote 38, at 169 (noting that third parties first advocated the
"direct election of senators, women's suffrage, nomination through party primaries, the
eight-hour work day, child labor laws, federal farm aid, and the graduated income tax").
491 SeeJohn Hicks, The Third Party Tradition in American Politics, 20 Miss. VALLEY HIST.
REv. 3, 26-27 (1933), quoted in Barmann, supranote 489, at 444-45.
492 See REICHLEY, supra note 6, at 113-34.
493 Notably, states that use very low ballot access requirements do not experience difficulties. NewJersey, for example, requires only 800 signatures for a statewide party, and yet
experiences no difficulty with ballot clutter or an unstable political system. See Winger,
supra note 365, at 16.
494 See Sundquist, supranote 27, at 214-16; KEmr, supra note 59, at 312-13.
495
See Sundquist, supra note 27, at 214-15 (calling the progressive Republicans "an
ineffectual remnant" and explaining that "conservative Democrats have ended their careers one by one").
496 See Katz & Kolodny, supra note 2, at 31 (describing electoral competition as between two candidates, "one called the 'Democrat' and the other called the 'Republican'
but neither chosen by a party with any organizational control over their selection.").
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ness of American parties because it allows any candidate with support
to harness the power of the party's name in the electorate. 49 7 It has
produced an unpredictable and volatile nomination process. 498 As
James Sundquist notes, " [i] t has to appear anomalous that anyone, no
matter how ideologically opposed to the program and philosophy of
the Democratic or Republican Party, may ran for Congress as the
Party's candidate .... ,"499 Earlier this Note argued that major political
parties are no longer sacrificial lambs required to submit to this situation.5 0 0 Although the wide use of direct primaries probably guarantees their continuation in a substantially unaltered form given that
top-down decisionmaking is politically untenable, 50 ' associational
rights put the major parties in a strong legal position to introduce
mechanisms to screen candidates and to actively influence party
nominations.
Legal developments which alter the legal status of political parties
warrant close attention.50 2 The legal environment profoundly influences their development.50 3 They are highly adaptable organizations
that are affected by the external constraints imposed by outside
forces 5 0 4 As William J. Keefe has noted, "parties are less what they
make of themselves than what their environment makes of them."50 5
The legal system has changed; the parties are likely to change in response 5 06 If parties are to increase their strength as electoral organiSee Lawson, supra note 7, at 247-50.
See Ceaser, supra note 5, at 108.
499 Sundquist, supranote 27, at 217.
500 See supraPart I.D and text accompanying notes 239-41.
501
Twenty-six states use a closed primary system, in which only party members can
vote. Twenty-one states use open primaries, in which all voters may participated in the
primary. See KEE E, supra note 59, at 89-91.
502
Strong parties have the power to shape political competition in the electorate. E.E.
Schattschneider, the great scholar of parties, explained that the parties are not "merely
appendages of modem government; they are in the center of it and play a determinative
497

498

and creative role in it." E.E. SCHrrSCME EmR,PARuTY GOVERNMENT 1 (1942).
503 For example, the state laws in the Northeast are more likely to support strong parties, while the electoral laws in the southern states tend to weaken parties. KEEE, supra
note 59, at 3.
504
See Ceaser, supranote 5, at 136-37 (arguing that law is one of the most important
factors influencing the development of political parties).
505 KEEFE, supra note 59, at 1.
506
Professor Lowenstein claims that "the underlying issues at stake in the litigation
over parties' constitutional rights... are unlikely to have any but the most marginal consequences for ... , basic party structure." Lowenstein, supra note 43, at 1744. Political Scientist James Ceaser disagrees:
If no one at this point can say how far the principle of legal autonomy for
parties will go, it is certain to have profound implications. Changes in legal
status generally work their effects well beyond the immediate cases at hand.
Moreover, the efforts to win a new legal status for political parties, whether
pursued in courts or in legislatures, affect parties at their base in the states
and localities. It is here in the long run that the battle for stronger parties
will ultimately be decided.
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zations, they will need to take advantage of the new legal flexibility
created by the Supreme Court's associational rights doctrine.
Although the ideological purity of the major parties has increased, the levels of partisanship in the American electorate have decreased. 50 7 In 1946, only twenty percent of the population identified
themselves as "Independents."50 8 By 1992, there were more Independents than Republicans and these voters were "attracted to
third-party or independent presidential candidates." 50 9 Even more
striking, in 1944, a Roper Poll found that only fourteen percent of the
public supported the creation of a new party to challenge the Democrats and Republicans. 5 10 In October 1992, sixty-three percent of
those surveyed favored the creation of a third political party.51 ' Will
our legal-electoral system meet the demands of these voters?
If voters want choices not represented by the two major parties, it
is questionable whether all the political activity should be channeled
by the electoral system through the major parties. As political scientists recognize, the legal barriers to third-party activity provide a strong
incentive for independent candidates to attempt to participate within
the major parties. 512 If the major parties continue to develop into
stronger, more ideologically pure parties, the parties might resist or
deter the inclusion of candidates with views that conflict with the party
mainstream. And a strong argument could be made that this is perfectly acceptable in a system of party governance. Yet, as the desire for
more political choice increases, the systemic bias created by onerous
ballot access laws seems increasingly undemocratic. Therefore, perhaps the double standard the legal system has created needs to be
reassessed. If the Supreme Court continues to expand the associational rights of political parties, it should realize these changes increase the influence of the major political parties as political actors
and reinforce the disparity between major and minor parties in the
political marketplace.

Ceaser, supra note 5, at 128-29.
507 See KEE, supra note 59, at 290.
508 See id. at 205 fig.5-4 (presenting data collected in Gallup Report). See generally
GORDON S. BLACK & BENjAMIN D. BLAcK, THE PoLITIcs oF AMERIcAN DiscoN'ENr 150-56
(1994) (providing overview of the rise of independent voters); MARTIN P. WATTENBERG,
THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PoLIcIAL PARTIEs 1952-1992 (1994) (documenting the long-

term decline in partisanship among the electorate).
509
510

KEEFE, supranote 59, at 290.
See BLACK & BAcx, supra note 508, at 23.

511 See id. at 25 (reporting national poll of likely voters by Yankelovich, Clancy, and
Schulman).
512

See KEEFE, supra note 59, at 62.
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CONCLUSION

The essence of democracy is choice. There are two avenues for
candidates to provide voters with that choice: political competition inside or outside the major parties. The expanding associational rights
of major parties and the continued viability of onerous state ballot
access laws will probably not increase political choice in American
politics. Perhaps the answer, as some legal commentators have advocated, is a return to strict scrutiny of state ballot access laws.5 13 This
solution would place greater limitations on states' ability to enact legal
barriers to third party activity. States would be forced to demonstrate
a compelling interest to justify such regulations. However, this Note
demonstrates that whether there are doctrinal solutions to the disparate legal status of major and minor parties, given the current legal
climate, this solution is little more than wishful thinking. If the answer to increasing ballot access lies anywhere, it appears to be in the
hands of state legislatures.
Benjamin D. Blackt

513 See Porto, supra note 4, at 315-17; Smith, Note, supra note 38, at 212-14.
t I would like to thank Fred Bertram, Haeryung Shin, and Andrew Wisch for their
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